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Abstract
This thesis develops a method for examining the role peer effects play in treatment
effect models. We focus on the scenario where peer effects are important in deter-
mining the treatment decision. Identification of both the treatment decision and the
associated marginal treatment effect is explored. In particular, exogenous and en-
dogenous peer effects are used as instruments to identify marginal treatment effects.
A Bayesian estimation procedure is presented, utilising a network formation model to
adjust for unobserved peer effects. The performance of the model and the estimation
procedure is analysed through a Monte Carlo experiment. The proposed method is
then applied to estimate the effect of high school peers on the decision to attend
college, and the return to education associated with such a decision using the Add
Health data-set. Both the Monte Carlo experiment and the empirical application
underscore the importance of accounting for the presence of peer effects in treatment
effects models, and allows us to consider policy implications of peer effects.
ii
Declaration
I certify that this work contains no material which has been accepted for the award
of any other degree or diploma in my name, in any university or other tertiary insti-
tution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously
published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made
in the text. In addition, I certify that no part of this work will, in the future, be
used in a submission in my name, for any other degree or diploma in any university
or other tertiary institution without the prior approval of the University of Adelaide
and where applicable, any partner institution responsible for the joint-award of this
degree.
I give permission for the digital version of my thesis to be made available on the web,
via the University’s digital research repository, the Library Search and also through
web search engines, unless permission has been granted by the University to restrict
access for a period of time.
I acknowledge the support I have received for my research through the provision of





Firstly I would like to thank my supervisors Firmin Doko Tchatoka and Virginie
Masson, who have supported and guided me along the whole journey. It has been
a privilege to work with both of you over many years. Thank-you especially to
my family and friends who have always encouraged me to persevere and kept me
balanced. Thanks to the other postgraduate students and academics who took the
time to check-in, have discussions and give advice. I would also like to acknowledge
the assistance of the Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina, in
providing access to the Add-Health dataset. An extra thanks to Dr Chih-Sheng
Hsieh, for providing Matlab codes and answering questions.
iv
Chapter 1
Marginal Returns to Treatment and
Social Networks
1 Introduction
We live and relate in an increasingly interconnected world. The social networks
we associate in are ever expanding with the advent of globalisation and social me-
dia. Decisions and outcomes are not isolated to an individual, but are spread across
networks and influenced by peers. Peer effects present themselves in a variety of
contexts ranging from alcohol use (Kremer and Levy, 2008; Fletcher, 2012a) and
delinquency (Patacchini and Zenou, 2012) to loan behaviour (Karlan et al., 2005)
and obesity (Christakis and Fowler, 2007). Peer influence can act directly through
conformism effects; as individual decision is swayed by the decisions of friends, or
indirectly through the influence of personality and individual characteristics. Eco-
nomics has begun to recognise the importance social ties play in the outcomes of
individuals and the implications for policy. The influence of networks implies the
existence of a social multiplier (Glaeser et al., 2003), such that the decision of one
individual or the effect of policy on that individual is dispersed across their network.
As a result, the net effect of policy becomes greater than the direct effect usually
intended by policy makers, particularly if the individual is central in their network.
Peer effects are prominent in both the binary decisions made by individuals and
observable continuous outcomes. In the education context, peer effects have been
observed in the decision of an individual to attend college, their choice of major
(Bifulco et al., 2011; Fletcher, 2013, 2012b; Wu, 2015), and resulting wages (Barbone
and Dolton, 2015; Kramarz and Skans, 2014; Black et al., 2013). The structure of
an econometric treatment effects model allows us to measure the returns to binary
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treatment decisions. While peer influence can be expected to play a critical role
in both binary decisions and observed outcomes, little research has focused on the
incorporation of networks within a treatment framework. This thesis develops a
model where peer effects are influential in shaping a binary treatment decision and,
indirectly, observed outcomes and returns to treatment. Manski (2013) examines the
identification of a treatment model where social interactions are important in the
treatment response, i.e., when the treatment of peers affects individual’s outcomes
(e.g., immunisation). This thesis, in contrast, focuses on the role of social interactions
on the treatment itself and the subsequent impact of the treatment on the observed
outcome. We study the identification of such a model and quantify the role peer
effects play in changes to policy.
The model is applied to analyse the critical decision of high school students to
enter college. A common treatment model examines the effect of the binary decision
to attend college on future wages (Carneiro et al., 2011). Returns to education should
optimally be (and commonly are) considered in the decision to attend college. As
a result, heterogeneous returns to education are expected, i.e. those who do attend
college have higher returns, while those who do not attend college would not benefit
greatly from doing so. The treatment effects model can be used to identify the effect
of treatment on the outcome equation, accounting for heterogeneity in the returns
to treatment.
Economic network literature has considered the effect of peers on both the deci-
sion to attend college and labour market outcomes. We bridge these two settings to
analyse the interaction between peer effects and the returns to education.
This paper draws from both the treatment effects and peer effects literature to
identify the effect of peers on the marginal returns to a binary decision. In particular,
we consider the interaction between peer effect models, such as the one proposed by
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013), and the treatment effects model. This is far
from straightforward due to the numerous interrelated avenues through which peer
effects operate.
In his 1993 pioneering research on the identification of peer effects, Manski ex-
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plores the issue of identification in light of the “reflection problem”. The “reflection
problem” refers to the difficulty in isolating two types of peer effect; endogenous and
exogenous effects, which are often strongly correlated.
Endogenous social effects refer to the direct influence of an individual’s outcomes
or decisions on their peers. The decision of one individual often directs the decisions
made by the friends of that individual. Consider a high school student who decides
to take up smoking. The friends of that student have a much higher probability
of smoking than individuals who have no friends that smoke (Mercken et al., 2010;
Christakis and Fowler, 2008).
The second effect, exogenous social effects (or contextual effects), describes the
influence of an individual’s characteristics on his peers’ outcomes. For example, if an
individual is proactive and hard working, he will likely have influence on the decisions
of his friends, particularly in his college decision. Taking another example, Bifulco
et al. (2014) show that having peers with college educated mothers leads to a higher
probability of individuals attending college themselves.
A third non-peer effect, the correlated effect, often confounds identification of the
exogenous and endogenous effects. Correlated effects refer to common factors that
influence the outcomes of all individuals in the same peer group. Moffitt et al. (2001)
segregates correlated effects into homophily and environmental effects. Individuals
are prone to homophily, where friendships are chosen based on similarity in char-
acteristics or personality. These characteristics, like social extroversion or athletic
ability, can be difficult to observe, but lead to similar observed outcomes between
peers. Furthermore, individuals in common environments (high schools, workplaces)
face similar surroundings and influences. Students in the same high school will ex-
perience similarities in teaching style, school resources and socio-economic status,
which lead to similarities in decisions and outcomes. The difficulty lies in determin-
ing the reason the decisions and outcomes of these peers look similar. Is it truly a
peer effect, or is it simply because they face a common environment, or chose their
friendship groups based on similarity in characteristics?
This paper serves as a preliminary investigation of the flexibility of the peer effect
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model and its components and how they interact with existing econometric models.
The model presented in this paper draws on the model in Goldsmith-Pinkham and
Imbens (2013) in the network estimation literature and Carneiro et al. (2011) in the
treatment effects literature. We consider the response of the marginal treatment ef-
fect (MTE) and the marginal policy relevant treatment effect (MPRTE), as presented
in Carneiro et al. (2011), to the presence of peer effects. These measures allow us to
control for heterogeneity in returns and are more robust than traditional measures
(e.g. average treatment effect, treatment effect for the treated). The MTE describes
the effect of treatment for individuals who are at the margin i.e. are indifferent to
receiving treatment. The MPRTE, proposed by Carneiro, Heckman, and Vytlacil
(2010), measures the returns to treatment for those induced into treatment as the
result of a marginal change in policy. Estimation of the MPRTE in this setting
enables us to consider the effect of a change in policy on the returns to a binary
decision, when peer effects are present.
We start by outlining the theoretical model, before presenting identification re-
sults and proposing a Bayesian estimation method. The model is then tested using
simulated data in a Monte Carlo experiment. An application studies the educational
attainment model using the Add-Health dataset, which contains friendship network
data for high school students. This application underscores the importance of con-
trolling for peer effects when estimating the returns to education.
Throughout our analysis, the policy effects on the returns to treatment will also
be considered. In particular, we investigate the implications of changes in peer effects,
network structures and policy initiatives on the returns to treatment.
2 Relevant Literature
Comprehensive network data has only recently begun to emerge due to the complex-
ities in accurately describing and measuring networks. Accompanying several key
datasets, the research on networks and peer effects has expanded in recent years.
Jackson (2013); Jackson et al. (2017) identify several of the challenges many re-
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searchers encounter when measuring peer effects, namely, identification, endogenous
networks and homophily, computation, measurement error and misspecification. In
particular, the identification of peer effects has proven to be a difficult prospect.
Manski’s (1993) infamous “reflection problem” describes the difficulty in sepa-
rately identifying endogenous and exogenous peer effects. When an individual in-
teracts with groups, he is both influenced by and influential in his peer’s groups.
As such the expected outcomes of a peer group (endogenous effects) and the mean
characteristics of the group (exogenous effects) cannot be easily separated.
Traditionally, the peer effects literature has assumed that individuals interact in
groups, with each member having an equal influence on all others in the group. Under
such conditions identification is difficult (Manski, 1993; Moffitt et al., 2001). Lee
(2007) established identification under the condition that the individual is excluded
from their own peer group and peer groups have at least three distinct sizes. Relaxing
the peer group assumption, the structure and non-linearity of social networks is a
useful tool for identification. In the notable paper of Bramoullé, Djebbari, and Fortin
(2009), generalising the models of Manski (1993), Moffitt et al. (2001) and Lee (2007),
the structure of an individual’s network is exploited to allow identification, using
an instrumental variables approach. Consistent estimation, however, can only be
achieved under the exogeneity of the network. This exogeneity assumption does not
hold in the presence of correlated effects; characteristics which are correlated with
both the choice of peers and the outcome variable.
Lee (2007), as in Lin (2010), Bramoullé et al. (2009), addresses the correlated
effect empirically by introducing an unobserved network fixed effect variable into the
model. This approach, while an improvement on existing measures, does not account
for within-network variation which may influence the outcome. As an example, an
unobserved personality characteristic such as social extroversion may influence not
only who an individual becomes friends with, but also whether they attend col-
lege, their place of employment and resulting wage. If this effect is present and not
accounted for, the network will be endogenous, causing bias in the peer effect esti-
mates. Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) propose a network formation model
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to control for this network endogeneity. The network formation model incorporates
unobserved individual characteristics which influence the likelihood of friendship for-
mation and observed outcomes. The model relies on asymptotic network theory to
achieve identification. Hseih and Lee (2016) apply the model of Goldsmith-Pinkham
and Imbens, relaxing some of their identifying assumptions.
The network formation literature holds promise for greater accuracy in the anal-
ysis of peer effects. Jackson et al. (2017) critiques the network formation model of
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens, while confirming the general theoretic approach.
The link-by-link model of Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens is, in general, too sim-
plistic to accurately reflect the interconnected network formation process. We use
the original network formation model proposed by Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens,
though alternate network formation approaches could also be integrated. Other sim-
pler approaches have been taken, particularly in the applied literature (Patacchini
et al., 2011; Kremer and Levy, 2008; Patacchini and Zenou, 2012), but generally fail
to adequately control for the endogeneity issue. De Paula (2016) and Blume et al.
(2011) offer a detailed overview of the literature concerning peer effect identification.
The linear in means model used in this paper can be derived from the utility
theory setup of Blume et al. (2011). However, other theory approaches can be taken,
specifically integrating the formation of friendships. Badev (2013) proposes one such
network approach, deriving the Nash equilibrium of a friendship network to identify
and decompose peer effects, while Boucher (2015) focuses heavily on the homophily
aspects of friendships. Calvó-Armengol et al. (2009) combine the existing network
formation model framework with network centrality concepts to achieve identification
of peer and network effects.
Introducing non-linearities tends to complicate estimation in the peer effect model
(Blume et al., 2011). In this paper we will examine the role of peers in a binary
decision. This nonlinearity is explored in Soetevent and Kooreman (2007) using the
standard utility theory set-up to derive the reduced form equations and equilibrium
conditions. Similarly Brock and Durlauf (2001), and Blume et al. (2011) present
alternate game theoretic approaches in a group interaction context. Lee, Li, and
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Lin (2014) extend the approach of Brock and Durlauf (2001) from peer groups to
networks. The binary model is applied in several empirical papers using a simple
linear probability model setup (Patacchini and Arduini, 2016; Fletcher, 2012a). In
most binary settings, Blume et al. (2011) and Blume et al. (2015) assert that the
reflection problem is no longer pertinent.
Apart from these, limited research has been conducted on the estimation of an
econometric binary peer model. The likelihood function of such a model requires
an n-dimensional probit likelihood, which is computationally difficult to evaluate.
The problem has, however, been considered in the spatial literature using the spatial
autoregressive model (SAR). The estimation in this paper makes use of the spatial
literature surrounding the estimation of a probit/logit SAR model. A comparison of
the techniques to estimate such a model can be found in Calabrese and Elkink (2014).
The method used in this paper follows that presented in LeSage (2000) and updated
in LeSage and Pace (2009), who use a Bayesian estimation approach. This formalises
and extends the original method of Chib (1992) and Albert and Chib (1993). The
Bayesian approach tends to outperform other estimation methods, particularly under
low spatial autocorrelation. The Bayesian approach can also be adapted to intersect
with the Bayesian estimation of the Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) model.
Therefore, we work to combine the estimation methods of Goldsmith-Pinkham
and Imbens, and Lesage to estimate a binary peer effects model in the first stage. In
the second stage we follow Carneiro et al. (2011) in estimating the marginal returns
to a binary decision.
The treatment model presented by Carneiro et al. (2011) estimates the heteroge-
neous returns to treatment, in the context of education, using the marginal treatment
effect (MTE) measure. The MTE represents the effect of treatment for those who
are indifferent to treatment (i.e. individuals who are at the margin). Björklund and
Moffitt (1987) first proposed the MTE as an alternate measure to traditional estima-
tors such as the average treatment effect (ATE) and average treatment effect of the
treated (ATET) which do not account for heterogeneous treatment effects. Carneiro
et al. (2011) use the MTE to consider the true effect of policy changes, deriving
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the marginal policy relevant treatment effect (MPRTE) first developed by Carneiro
et al. (2010). The MPRTE measures the returns to treatment for those induced into
treatment by a marginal change in policy.
Carneiro et al. (2011) propose both a parametric and non-parametric estimation
of these marginal effects, while Carneiro et al. (2010) examine the properties of these
estimates. The instrumental variables method used to examine policy effects was




(yi, Xi, Zi, Si) : 1 ≤ i ≤ N
}
be an i.i.d. sample of N observations, where
yi is the i-th observation on an outcome variable, Xi is the i-th observation on
K1 covariates (possibly endogenous), and Zi is a K2-dimensional vector of the i-th
observations on exogenous covariates (instruments). Let S be a treatment variable,
i.e., Si = 1 if individual i is included in the treatment and Si = 0 otherwise. We
assume that the treatment decision is latent, i.e., we observed Si = 1 if S
∗
i > 0 and
Si = 0 if S
∗
i ≤ 0, where S∗ represents the net individual benefit of receiving treatment,
which depends on observed exogenous covariates Z and unobserved variables v.
Our goal is to measure the marginal returns to treatment. To achieve this, we
consider the framework of Carneiro et al. (2011) that generalises Roy (1958) and
Quandt (1958, 1972). The model consists of potential outcome equations represented
by
yj = µj(X) + uj, j = 0, 1, (3.1)
where µj(x) = E[yj|X = x]. y1 describes the outcomes for individuals in the treat-
ment group and y0 the outcomes for those not in the treatment group. The observed
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outcome is then given by:
y =: Sy1 + (1− S)y0 (3.2)
= µ0(X) + [µ1(X)− µ0(X)]S + (u1 − u0)S + u0.
Under this model, the return to treatment is defined as y1 − y0 = µ1(X)− µ0(X) +
u1− u0, µ1(x)−µ0(x) represents the average treatment effect conditional on X = x,
and µ1(x)− µ0(x) + E[u1 − u0|S = 1, X = x] is the average treatment effect for the
treated. In the special case of a linear model [i.e., when µj(X) = Xβj], (3.2) can be
written as
y = Xβ0 +X[β1 − β0]S + [(u1 − u0)S + u0] (3.3)
so that δ ≡ δ(x) =: x(β1 − β0) measures the average treatment effect conditional on
X = x.
We suppose that the treatment decision is latent and represents the net individual
benefit of receiving treatment. The standard treatment model1 usually specifies S∗
as the difference between observable variables Z and unobservable factors v, i.e.
S∗ = µS(Z)− v, µS(z) = E[S∗|Z = z], (3.4)
where Z may include exogenous variables in X in addition to other exogenous in-
struments. In this study, we emphasise the possibility that the specification of S∗ in
(3.4) may also include the characteristics of one’s peers.
Let F denote the common distribution2 of the sample (yi, Xi, Zi)
N
i=1 . We assume
EF [(uji, vi)|Zi] = 0 for all i = 1, . . . , N and all j = 0, 1, i.e., Zi is uncorrelated
with uji and vi (orthogonality condition). We also assume that the vi’s are strictly
increasing and continuous r.v. (random variables) with common distribution Fv.
The latter assumption is also used in Carneiro et al. (2011) and implies that the
1e.g., see Carneiro et al. (2011, Eq.(3)).
2Note that F may depend on the sample size N, say FN , but we drop the indexation by N for
convenience.
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probability of undertaking treatment (S∗ > 0 or S = 1) conditional on Z = z can
then be expressed as
P (z) ≡ P[S = 1|Z = z] = Fv(µS(z)). (3.5)
The quantity P (z) in (3.5) is usually referred to as propensity score or probability of
selection. Let US = Fv(v), i.e., US is a uniform r.v. whose values correspond to the
quantiles of v. Therefore, (3.4) holds if and only if P (Z) ≥ US, so P (Z) is interpreted
as the mean scale utility function; see McFadden (1974).
3.1 Social networks and treatment decision
In this section, we explore the inclusion of peer effects in the treatment decision
model (3.4). As in the linear-in-means model of Manski (1993), we assume that the
decision of individuals to undertake treatment is affected by the mean characteristics
of their peers.3
Suppose that individuals belong to m pre-specified groups and let Gg : Ng ×Ng
represent a network associated with each group g = 1, . . . ,m. We consider the
following model for the latent treatment variable S∗g :
S∗g = γ1GgS
∗






(γ2,kINg + γ3,kGg)Zgk + αgιg + γ4ξg − vg, (3.6)
where S∗g : Ng × 1, Zg = [Zg1, . . . , ZgK2 ] : Ng × K2 with Zgk : Ng × 1 for all k =
1, . . . , K2, ιg : Ng × 1 is a vector of ones, ξg : Ng × 1 contains unobserved within
group characteristics affecting both the treatment decision and the formation of the
network, γ4 is the effect of these unobserved characteristics, vg : Ng× 1 is a vector of
disturbances, γ1 : 1×1 represents the endogenous peer effect (the average benefits to
treatment for an individual’s peers in the network Gg), γ3 = (γ3,1, . . . , γ3,K2)
′ : K2×1
describes the exogenous peer effect (the average characteristics of an individual’s
3We apply this to a binary model as done in the spatial literature– e.g., see Anselin (1988).
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peers in the network Gg), γ2 = (γ2,1, . . . , γ2,K2)
′ : K2 × 1 measures the direct impact
of Zg on the treatment decision, and αg : 1 × 1 represents the group fixed effect






′. The main difference between model (3.6) and the one considered in
Bramoullé et al. (2009, Eq.(1)) and Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013, Eq.(4.2))
is the latent nature of S∗g , which introduces additional complexity in estimation of
the parameters as we see later on. Following Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013),













is a symmetric adjacency matrix such that Dg,ii = 0 for






is an Ng×1 vector with elements Mg,i =
∑Ng
j=1Dg,ij representing
the number of friends of individual i.4 Clearly, the network Gg is a row-normalised
adjacency matrix, and can be used to determine the average friend of an individual.
The network may be observed at multiple time periods but for simplicity, we drop
the dependence over time. Hereinafter, Dg− and Gg− denote the non-normalised
and row-normalised adjacency matrices at the previous period, respectively.
By noting that the determinant of the matrix INg − γ1Gg has the form written
as det(INg − γ1Gg) =
∏
j=1
(1− γ1λjg), where λjg, j = 1, . . . , Ng, are the eigenvalues of
Gg satisfying −1 < λjg ≤ 1 [e.g., see Case (1991, footnote 5)], it is straightforward
to see that INg − γ1Gg is invertible as long as |γ1| < 1. Under this condition, the
reduced-form model for S∗g can be expressed using the second equality in (3.6) as:
S∗g = (INg − γ1Gg)−1αgιg + (INg − γ1Gg)−1Bqvec(Zg) + (INg − γ1Gg)−1γ4ξg − ηg, (3.8)
where vec(Zg) is the NgK2 × 1 dimensional column vectorization of Zg, ηg = (INg −
4Individuals with no friends are discounted from the model so that Mg,i > 0.
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γ1Gg)
−1vg ≡ (ηg,1, . . . , ηg,Ng)′, and Bq is given by
Bq =:
[
γ2,1INg + γ3,1Gg, . . . , γ2,K2INg + γ3,K2Gg
]
: Ng ×NgK2.









(INg − γ1Gg)′(INg − γ1Gg)]−1, (3.9)
i.e., ηg,i ∼ N(0, σ2ηg,i) where σ
2
ηg,i
is the (i, i)th element of Ση. Clearly, the errors ηg,i
of the reduced-form regression (3.8) are heteroskedastic by construction. Let bg,i·,
i = 1, . . . , Ng, denote the ith row of the matrix bg :






: Ng ×Ng(K2 + 2),





′ : Ng(K2 + 2) × 1. Under the assumption
that vg ∼ N(0, σ2vgINg), the propensity score (probability of treatment decision) of
individual i in network Gg, conditional on Z̃g = z̃g, is given by
Pi(z̃g) =: P[Sg,i = 1|Z̃g = z̃g]




, i = 1, . . . , Ng, (3.10)
where Φ(·) is the cdf of N(0, 1) and γg,i· = σ−1ηg,ibg,i· : 1×Ng(K2 + 2).
The marginal treatment effect (MTE)5 is defined as the effect of treatment (at-
tending college for example) on those indifferent to undertaking treatment, given the
characteristics Xg and the propensity score P (Z̃g), i.e.
MTE(xg, uSg) = E(y1g − y0g|Xg = xg, USg = uSg), g = 1, . . . ,m. (3.11)
Carneiro et al. (2011, Eqs.(5)-(6)) show that (3.10) along with the definition of the
5This was originally developed by Björklund and Moffitt (1987) and extended in Heckman and
Vytlacil (2005, 1999, 2007b)
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uniform r.v. USg implies MTE(xg, uSg) can be expressed as:
∂E(yg|Xg = xg, P (Z̃g) = pg)
∂pg
= MTE(xg, pg), g = 1, . . . ,m, (3.12)
where yg is the observed outcome in (3.2). As USg has been normalized to be unit
uniform, tracing MTE(xg, uSg) over uSg values shows how the returns to treatment
vary with different quantiles of the unobserved component of the index of the desire
to undertake the treatment. Alternatively, it is the mean return to treatment for
persons indifferent between undertaking treatment or not who have mean scale utility
value P (Z̃g) = uSg . From (3.2), it is easy to see that
E[yg|Xg = Xg, P (Z̃g) = pg] = E[y0g|Xg = xg, P (Z̃g) = pg]
+ E[(y1g − y0g)|Xg = xg, P (Z̃g) = pg]pg, g = 1, . . . ,m. (3.13)
In particular, if Model (3.1) is linear, i.e. if µj(xg) = xgβj for j ∈ {0, 1}, we have:
E[yg|Xg = xg, P (Z̃g) = pg] = xgβ0 + pgxg(β1 − β0) +K(pg) (3.14)
where K(pg) = E[(u1g − u0g|Sg = 1, P (Z̃g) = pg], which can be estimated non-
parametrically, for example, using local polynomial regressions; see Fan and Gijbels
(1996). As outlined in Carneiro et al. (2011), aggregating the instruments Z̃g into
the scalar index P (Z̃g) enlarges the range of values over which we can identify the
MTE in comparison to using each instrument one at a time.
3.2 Network Formation Model
The inclusion of the unobserved within group characteristics, ξg, affecting both the
treatment decision and the formation of the network in (3.6) raises additional difficul-
ties in estimating the marginal treatment effect in (3.12). Studies such as Patacchini
and Zenou (2012) often assume that the inclusion of network and school correlated
effect dummies can help to identify the linear model. In the current context, this
13
approach implies dropping ξg out of model (3.6). Patacchini and Zenou (2012) argue
that once the group fixed effect is controlled for, peer group formation is random con-
ditional on the network. Fletcher (2012a), Kremer and Levy (2008) and Patacchini
et al. (2011) also use a similar approach.
Similarly, Bramoullé et al. (2009) partially account for the problematic environ-
mental effects by using network-level unobservable characteristics. They show that
these unobserved characteristics can be partialled out in the estimation process us-
ing a within network transformation of the model. However, this approach does
not account for the within network individual level variations. Controlling for these
variations is important, especially in networks with a high diameter, where linked
individuals share common characteristics, but those further away in the network are
dissimilar in these characteristics. In our model, within-network variations are repre-
sented by ξg. In a network of high school students, these unobserved characteristics
may represent social or communication skills that affect friendships that are made
during high school, but also are important determinants of whether an individual
decides to attend college. Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) allows the inclu-
sion of unobserved terms by utilising a network formation process to determine the
network adjacency matrix. As such, we follow this method in controlling for within
network individual level variations [also, see Hseih and Lee (2016)].
For simplicity, we use the single unobserved factor setting of Goldsmith-Pinkham
and Imbens (2013) for the friendship formation model (i.e., ξg,i is a scalar for each
individual i), but the setup can be generalised to a multiple factor setting as in Hseih







3cg,ij + θ4Dg− ,ij + θ5Fg− ,ij + δ|ξg,i − ξg,j|+ εg,ij
Dg,ij = 1[Ug,ij > 0] · 1[Ug,ji > 0]
(3.15)
where Ug,ij represents the utility of individual i from a friendship link with individ-
ual j in network Dg, cg,i and cg,j represent the observed individual specific variables
which may affect friendship formation, cg,ij represents dyad-specific variables which
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may be either dummy variables indicating the same characteristic between individ-
uals i and j (e.g. race or sex) or the difference between two continuous individual
characteristics (e.g. difference in age, difference in household income),6 and the θ’s
are unknown parameters. Differences in the unobserved characteristics towards every
potential friendship (i, j)(i.e., |ξg,i − ξg,j|) are considered in (3.15) as key factors of
network formation. A low value of |ξg,i − ξg,j| will result in a likely friendship pair
(i, j), while a higher value indicates that i and j will not be friends. As such, the
parameter δ can be viewed as a measure of friendship intensity in this model. Dg−
and Fg− characterize the network in the previous period. In particular, Dg− ,ij is a
dummy variable indicating whether i and j were friends in the previous period, while
Fg− ,ij is a dummy variable representing whether i and j had friends in common in
the previous period. Clearly, we see that at least two observations (data points) on
the network are required to fully identify the friendship relations from (3.15). Be-
cause of this dynamic aspect, model (3.15) is more general than the one considered,
for example, in Hseih and Lee (2016). Finally, εg,ij represent the error terms which
are uncorrelated with the unobserved characteristics ξg,i and the errors vg,i of the
treatment decision model (3.6).
Specifying a model for network formation is complex for many reasons. First,
misspecification is usually an issue in these types of models. Second, endogeneity is-
sues may introduce bias, so that estimates of these models should be interpreted with
caution (Jackson, 2013). Many factors must be accounted for in order to minimise
these biases. For example, model (3.15) controls for the effect of homophily through
the inclusion of unobserved characteristics (ξg,i) and transitivity in link formation
through the inclusion of Fg− . Graham (2013) points out that a network formation
model should also account for degree heterogeneity, such that some individuals are
naturally “good friends” and thus give greater utility to friendship. Model (3.15)
accounts for this degree heterogeneity by controlling for the observed characteristics
in the network formation (i.e., cg,i, cg,j).
For the remainder of the paper, we define Cg =
{
cg,i, cg,j, cg,ij|(i, j) ∈ Gg
}
and
6These individual characteristics may overlap with those in Zg,i in equation (3.6).
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consider the following assumptions on the model variables and parameters.
Assumption 3.1 Given Dg− , Cg, and ξg, each link of network Dg is (conditionally)
independent of other links.
Assumption 3.2 The errors εg,ij of the regression (3.15) are i.i.d. and follow a
standard logistic distribution given Dg− , Cg, and ξg.









for all g = 1, . . . ,m.
Assumptions 3.1–3.3 are commonly used in the literature on social networks–
e.g., see Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) and Hseih and Lee (2016). Three
features often observed from network data are homophily, transitivity of relations
and clustering (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Jackson, 2008), and all suggest that
link decisions in networks tend to be dependent. Assumption 3.1 states that link
decisions in networks are independent after controlling for homophily, transitivity of
relations, and clustering, i.e., the links of Dg can be dependent unconditionally.
If we define Wg,ij = {cg,i, cg,j, cg,ij, cg,ji, Dg− ,ij, Dg− ,ji, Fg− ,ij, Fg− ,ji, ξg,i, ξg,j}, the
probability of friendship givenWg,ij (i.e., given the exogenous covariates and the net-
work of the previous period) can be expressed under Assumption 3.2, [see Goldsmith-




















′, Λ(·) is the cdf of the standard logistic random variable,
and






3cg,ij + θ4Dg− ,ij + θ5Fg− ,ij + δ|ξg,i − ξg,j|.
Assumption 3.3, along with the definition of ηg in (3.8) implies (3.9). Note that
ξg may be correlated with Xg in the potential outcome equation (3.1) under this
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assumption, although exploring cases where ξg is independent of Xg is a reasonable
case to consider. Therefore, Assumption 3.3 allows for a possible dependence between
ξg and the errors uj (j = 0, 1) in (3.1), in which case we refer to Xg as an endogenous
regressor in (3.1). The variance of ξg,i is normalised to 1 in Assumption 3.3 because
it is not identified in either the treatment model (3.6) nor in the friendship formation
model (3.15); see Hseih and Lee (2016). In particular, this normalisation implies that
θ and γ can only be identified up to σ2ξ in (3.15).
Under Assumptions 3.1 & 3.2, the likelihood function of network Dg, conditional






















is defined by (3.16). Therefore, the likelihood function of

















is the conditional likelihood function in (3.17) and φ(ξg) is
the density of ξg ∼ N(0, INg) under Assumption 3.1.
Similarly, we can use Bayes rule to express the joint likelihood function of the
latent treatment decision S∗g and the network Gg, conditional on Zg and Wg, as:
Lξg
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S∗g |Zg,Wg; γ, αg, σ2vg
)
is the joint likelihood function of S∗g conditional
on Zg and Wg. Therefore, the joint likelihood function of S
∗
g and Gg, conditional on
observables Zg Cg, and Dg− , is obtained by integrating (3.19) over ξg, i.e.
L
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As S∗g is not observed, but we rather observe Sg = 1 when S
∗
g > 0 and Sg = 0 oth-
erwise, the usual probit method could be used to compute Lξgtreat
(
S∗g |Zg,Wg; γ, αg, σ2vg
)
from the reduced-form equation (3.8), along with Assumption 3.3. However, identifi-
cation in standard probit models requires normalising the variances of the errors ηg,i
(i.e., σ2ηg,i) to 1, as it cannot be jointly identified with the remaining parameters in
(3.8). This means that the standard probit estimation can only identify the param-
eters of the treatment equation (3.6) up to σ2ηg,i (i = 1, . . . , Ng) at best. Although
this may be a reasonable assumption to consider, and usually is the case in binary
outcome models, we employ an alternative approach that consists of simulating the
latent outcome variable S∗g from a multivariate truncated normal (TMVN) distri-
bution using the Gibbs sampling technique proposed by Geweke (1991), and then
applying the truncated regression methods to derive Lξgtreat
(
S∗g |Zg,Wg; γ, αg, σ2vg
)
.
This also allows us to estimate the model within the Bayesian setting, controlling for
the ξg terms without having to numerically integrate them out.
Indeed, it is well known that sampling from S∗g ∼ TMV N(µ,Ση)7 subject to the
inequality constraints a ≤ S∗g ≤ b is equivalent to sampling from τg ∼ N(0,Ση) under
the linear constraints b ≤ τg ≤ b̄, where b = a− µ, b̄ = b− µ, and then constructing
the sample for S∗g as S
∗
g = µ+ τg. Following Geweke (1991), we build up the sample
for τg from the conditional distribution of τg,i given τg,−i for all i = 1, . . . , Ng, where
τg,−i = τg \ τg,i denotes the vector formed with the components of τg other than τg,i.
Geweke (1991) shows that
E(τg,i|τg,−i) = γg,−iτg,−i, (3.21)
where γg,−i = −ω−1g,iiωg,−i, ωg,ij is the (i, j)th element of Σ−1η and ωg,−i is the ith row
of Σ−1η excluding the ith element. Therefore, we can model τg,i as:
τg,i = γg,−iτg,−i + hg,iνg,i, (3.22)
where hg,i = ω
−1/2
g,ii and νg,i ∼ N(0, 1) for all i and g. As b ≤ τg ≤ b̄, it follows from




(INg − γ1Gg)′(INg − γ1Gg)]−1 from (3.8).
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(3.22) that νg,i satisfies the constraints:
h−1g,i (bi − γg,−iτg,−i) < νg,i < h−1g,i (b̄i − γg,−iτg,−i), (3.23)
where bi = −∞, b̄i = −µi if Sg,i = 0 (i.e., if S∗g,i ≤ 0) and bi = −µi, b̄i = +∞ if
Sg,i = 1 (i.e., if S
∗
g,i > 0). νg,i ∼ N(0, 1) can be simulated with the restrictions in
(3.23) and τg,i can be generated following (3.22). Thus the sample for S
∗
g = µ + τg
can be built up using this method.
Applying the above results to model (3.8) gives the following conditional trun-

















, truncated at the right by 0 if Sg,i = 0,
(3.24)
for all i = 1, . . . , Ng and all g = 1, . . . ,m, where bg,i· is the ith row of bg defined
in (3.8) and σ2ηg ,i is the (i, i)th element of Ση. Let φ(·) and Φ(·) denote the pdf and
cdf of the standard normal random variable, respectively. The conditional density of
S∗g,i, given Z̃g and Wg, can be expressed from (3.24) as:


























































The marginal treatment effect (MTE) given in (3.14) can only be identified if both
the treatment decision equation (3.6) and the outcome equation (3.1) are identified.
In this section, we provide the conditions under which both equations are identified.
For simplicity, we shall focus on the case where the outcome (3.1) is linear, i.e.
µj(xg) = xgβjg for j ∈ {0, 1}. Since the identification of the MTEs depends on that
of the treatment decision model (3.6), it will be useful to investigate the latter first.
Various sources are threats to identifying the treatment model (3.6). First, the
inclusion of direct endogenous peer effects (i.e., GgS
∗
g ) as explanatory variables is
a threat to identification because these endogenous effects are subject to Manski’s
(1993) reflection problem. Bramoullé et al. (2009) propose to employ an instrumental
variable (IV) method, where friends’ decision to undertake treatment (i.e., GgS
∗
g ) is
instrumented with friends of friends’ characteristics (i.e., G2gZg). So, as long as
G2gZg is a valid and strong matrix of IVs, the reflection problem can be solved
by using, for example, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation. Second, the
inclusion of the friendship network unobserved characteristic ξg in (3.6) is vital for
achieving identification. If ξg is not controlled for, the error of this regression will
incorporate the unobserved network effects and will thus be correlated with GgZg,
GgS
∗
g and possibly Zg. We identify the treatment model (3.6) following a two-step
approach. Firstly, the network Gg is formed using the model (3.15). And secondly,
the parameters of the treatment model (3.6) are identified, given the constructed
network Gg, using 2SLS estimation. We summarize in Proposition 4.1 the conditions
under which equations (3.6) and (3.15) are identified.
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Proposition 4.1 Suppose that Assumptions 3.1–3.3 are satisfied. Then the following
two statements are true.
(a) Conditional on Wg, θ and δ are identified in (3.15).
(b) If (a) is satisfied and |γ1| < 1, γ2γ1 + γ3 6= 0, G2g 6= 0, then γ = (γ1, γ′2, γ′3, γ4)′
and αg are identified in (3.6) for all g = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof of Proposition 4.1 :
The proof of (a) follows straightforwardly from the logistic distributional assumption
of εg,ij in Assumption 3.2 along with Assumption 3.1, therefore it is omitted. The
proof of (b) follows identical steps as that of Proposition 3 of Bramoullé et al. (2009),
hence is also omitted to simplify the exposition.
While the inclusion of a network formation process allows us to estimate the
effect of unobservables in the treatment decision equation, the nonlinearity of the
outcome equation does not allow an equivalent approach using the proposed esti-
mation method. We can include observed variables in the outcome equation in an
attempt to control for any network correlated characteristics which also influence the
outcome. While an imperfect approach, if network effects are minimal as in our em-
pirical setting, endogenous effects are not a problem. We assume that the outcome
of one individual is independent from their peers, controlling for the effect of peers
directly on the treatment, i.e. there are no factors outside of the treatment through
which an individual may influence a peer.
5 Estimation
We follow the networks and spatial literature (e.g., see Goldsmith-Pinkham and
Imbens (2013) and LeSage and Pace (2009)) to estimate the networks and treatment
models simultaneously using a Bayesian method. To do this, we define the following
prior distributions for the parameters θ, δ, γ̄, the unobserved characteristics ξ, and
21
the latent variable S∗g :
(θ′, δ)′ ∼ N(φ0,Φ0), ξi,g ∼ N(0, 1),





′ ∼ N(γ0,Γ0), γ1 ∼ U [−1, 1], (5.1)
where φ0 : (q + 3) × 1, Φ0 : (q + 3) × (q + 3), γ0 : (2k + m + 1) × 1, and Γ0 :
(2k+m+1)×(2k+m+1) are fixed. These prior distributions in (5.1) are commonly
used in Bayesian literature (Hseih and Lee, 2016; LeSage and Pace, 2009). The
prior distribution for γ1 is restricted to the interval [−1, 1] to ensure the matrix
(INg − γ1Gg) is non-singular, and we use the normalization σv = 1. The posterior
distributions needed to estimate the model are constructed as follows.
1. First, we construct the posterior distribution of ξi,g as:
P (ξi,g|S∗g ,Gg, ξ−i,g, γ̄, θ, δ, σv, αg) ∼ π(ξi,g) · P (S∗g ,Gg|ξg, γ̄, θ, δ, σv, αg), (5.2)
where P (S∗g ,Gg|ξg, γ̄, θ, δ, σv, αg) is given by the likelihood in (3.19).
2. The conditional posterior for (θ′, δ)′ can be simplified to
P (θ, δ|Gg, ξg) ∝ π(θ, δ) ·
m∏
g=1
P (Gg|ξg, θ, δ). (5.3)
3. The posterior for γ1 is constructed as
P (γ1|S∗g ,Gg, ξg, γ̄, σv, αg) ∼
m∏
g=1
P (S∗g |Gg, ξg, γ1, γ̄, σv, αg). (5.4)








P (γ̄|S∗g ,Gg, ξg, γ1, σv) ∝ N(γ̄; γ0,Γ0) ·
m∏
g=1
P (S∗g |Gg, ξg, γ1, γ̄, σv, αg).




























Ag = INg − γ1Gg.
(5.5)
Initial values for all parameters and unknowns are chosen by the user. We set all
initial values to zero for simplicity. Parameters and unknowns are updated sequen-
tially using an MCMC approach. Given the likelihood in (3.26), we draw samples
from the posterior distributions given above at each stage of the MCMC. We run the
algorithm for T = 30000 iterations, where the first 20000 iterations are discarded.
At the tth iteration, the following steps are taken:
1. The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is used to draw samples ξ
(t)
i,g from the pos-
terior distribution P (ξi,g|S∗(t−1)g ,Gg, ξ(t−1)−i,g , γ̄(t−1), θ(t−1), δ(t−1), σv, α
(t−1)
g ) given








i+1,g , . . . , ξ
(t−1)
Ng ,g
). This occurs for every
individual i = 1, . . . , Ng and network g = 1, . . . ,m. The M-H procedure is as
follows:
(1) Propose ξ̃i,g ∼ N(ξ(t−1)i,g , κ2ξ), where κ2ξ is chosen by the user, and let
ξ̃g = (ξ
(t−1)
1,g , . . . , ξ
(t−1)
i−1,g , ξ̃i,g, ξ
(t−1)
i+1,g , . . . , ξ
(t−1)
Ng ,g
). The value of κ2ξ is adjusted
to achieve an acceptance rate between 20% and 40%.
(2) With probability equal to a(ξ
(t−1)
i,g ; ξ̃i,g) =
min
{





g , γ̄(t−1), θ(t−1), δ(t−1), σv, α
(t−1)
g )
· N(ξ̃i,g; 0, 1)
N(ξ
(t−1)







i,g equal to ξ̃i,g, otherwise, set it to ξ
(t−1)
i,g .
2. The M-H procedure is used to sample (θ(t)
′
, δ(t))′ from P (θ, δ|Gg, ξ(t)g ) given in
(5.3):








, where κ2θ,δ is chosen by
the user.





P (Gg|ξ(t)g , θ̃, δ̃)








, δ(t))′ equal to (θ̃′, δ̃)′, otherwise, set it to (θ(t−1)
′
, δ(t−1))′.
3. γ1 is sampled from the distribution P (γ1|S∗(t−1)g ,Gg, ξ(t)g , γ̄(t−1), σv, α(t−1)g ) in
(5.4) using the M-H algorithm, proceeding as follows:
(1) Propose γ̃1 ∼ N(γ(t−1)1 , κ2γ1), where κ
2
γ1
is chosen by the user.






P (S∗g |Gg, ξ
(t)
g , γ̄(t−1), γ̃1, σv, α
(t−1)
g )
P (S∗g |Gg, ξ
(t)
g , γ̄(t−1), γ
(t−1)













1 to γ̃1. Otherwise, set it to γ
(t−1)
1 .












from the posterior distribution P (γ̄|S∗(t−1)g ,Gg, ξ(t)g , γ(t)1 , σv) in (5.5). The sign
of γ4 will not be determined, as |ξg,i − ξg,j| is not affected by a change in the
signs of ξg,i, ξg,j. To address this, we fix γ4 to be positive using the acceptance-
rejection algorithm.
5. Following LeSage and Pace (2009); Geweke (1991), S
∗(t)
g is sampled from the










6. The propensity scores are calculated using the definition in (3.10). For simplic-
ity, we initially assume that (Xg, Zg) are independent of (u0g, u1g, vg). Then we
obtain the propensity scores as follows:
(a) The Peter M. Robinson (1998) method for estimating partially linear equa-
tions is used to obtain estimates of β0 and β1 − β0:
i. The difference between the outcome equation and its expected value



















ii. Kernel regressions of the dependent variable and each of the regressors
are run on Pg in order to estimate the expected values in equation
(5.6).
iii. The residuals from these kernel regressions are regressed on each other
to determine β0 and β1 − β0.
(b) Following (3.14), a local polynomial regression of yg−xgβ̂0−P (Z̃g)xg(β̂1−
β̂0) is run on P (Z̃g) to estimate the function K(P (Z̃g)) and its partial
derivative with respect to P (Z̃g)
8. Adding the partial derivative to xg(β̂1−
β̂0) results in an estimate for the MTE:







(c) To estimate the marginal policy relevant treatment effect (MPRTE), a
weighted average of the MTE is taken across the support of P (Zg). The
relevant weight is expressed conditional on the value of Xg and must be
integrated over the distribution of Xg.
9 We can measure different forms
8Fan and Gijbels (1996) recommend using a local quadratic estimator for fitting a first order
derivative. We therefore use a local quadratic estimator with a bandwidth that minimises the
residual square criterion proposed by Fan and Gijbels.
9Since conditioning on Xg is computationally demanding due to the possible high dimension of
Xg, as in Carneiro et al. (2011) we condition on the index Xg(β1 − β0) as an approximation.
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of the MPRTE using different weighting functions and definitions of the
policy change. In particular we consider the following three scenarios: (1)
a policy change that directly increases the probability of treatment equally
for all individuals, i.e., Pα = Pg + α; (2) a policy that proportionally
increases the probability of treatment, i.e., Pα = Pg(1 + α); and (3) a
policy that affects one of the instruments used in the treatment equation,
i.e., Zα = Zg + α.
7. Relaxing the assumption of exogeneity, identification of the model is considered
under the new assumption that Zg is independent of (u0g, u1g, vg) given Xg. The
MTE is identified over the support of P (Z̃g) holding the values of Xg constant.
The process of identification of the MTE is as follows:
(a) The value of (INg−γ1Gg)−1Xg is calculated at the 25th and 75th percentile
of the distribution of (INg − γ1Gg)−1Xg(β1 − β0).
(b) Holding (INg − γ1Gg)−1Xg constant at this point, the instruments are
allowed to vary.
(c) The MTE is calculated over the sections of P (Z̃g) that are supported as
the instruments are allowed to vary.
The MPRTE is a weighted average of the MTE, placing weights only on those
sections of the MTE that are identified. This MPRTE is calculated condi-
tional on the value of Xg so that the MPRTE is still identified even under the
endogeneity of Xg.
6 Monte Carlo Simulations
We simulate data in order to study the performance of the model. The MCMC
algorithm is iterated 30000 times, with the first 20000 samples discarded to obtain
estimates of the parameters to be estimated. This is repeated for R = 30 different
data samples to obtain estimates of the standard error. The data is simulated as
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follows:
[u1g, u0g, vg, Xg, Z
∗
g,1, Zg,2, ξg, cg,1] ∼ N(µ,Σ),
where,
µ = (0, 0, 0, 1, 0.8, 0, 0.5, 0.2)′,
and Σ is an 8 × 8 matrix with ones along the diagonal. The correlations between
variables are set to zero except for:
E(X ′gZ∗1g) = E(X ′gZ2g) = 0.2, E(Z ′1gξ) = 0.1, E(Z ′2gξ) = −0.2
E(u′0gu1g) = 0.3, E(u′0gvg) = 0.3, E(u′1gvg) = −0.5.
Zg,1i is a binary variable, such that Zg,1i = 1[Z∗g,1i≥0]. We assume that ξg is exogenous
in this setting. εg is generated according to a logistic distribution with mean 0 and
standard deviation 1. The network formation variables are constructed as:
cg,i = cg,1i, cg,j = ∅, cg,ij =
[
|Zg,2i − Zg,2j|, 1[Zg,1i=Zg,1j=1], 1[Zg,1i=Zg,1j=0]
]
.
Two networks of size 250, D1,D2, are constructed using the network formation
model in (3.15) at two time periods. Individuals with no friends are removed from
the sample. The network formation process is calibrated to ensure the number of
individuals with no friends is less than 20% of the original sample and the average
number of friends is greater than 10. We set
θ0 = 0.2, θ1 = 0.2, θ3 = (−0.9, 0.4, 0.5)′, θ4 = 0.2, θ5 = 0.1, δ = −1.2.
On average, 7 individuals with no friends are removed from the network, and the
remaining individuals have an average of 13.65 friendship connections. The average
dynamics of the network are given in Table 1.2. If individuals are friends in period 0,
they are likely to remain friends in period 1 (2.5% of possible friendships). Similarly,
if individuals are not friends in period 0, they are unlikely to form a new friendship
in period 1 (3.2% of possible friendships). Due to the large number of possible
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friendships (23100), we see more new friendships in period 1 than existing ones
carried from period 0.
Some network statistics are included in Table 1.1. An example of a generated
network can be seen in Figure 1.1. We see that the generated network is relatively
dense for the size of the network, due to the high number of average friendships.
We use this high degree in order to establish stronger results for the peer effects.
Average path length and diameter are low, with the average distance between any
two individuals being 2.62. On average, one large component is generated by the
network formation process. There is some evidence of clustering with 15% of possi-
ble triplets closed. Connections occur mostly on the same side of the network, with
fewer cross network links. This aligns with the homophily constructed in the model
such that an individual is likely to connect with their friend’s friends who are also
close in homophilic characteristics. This clustering would be more pronounced with
greater correlation between these variables in the network formation. As the gen-
erated variables are relatively uncorrelated, homophily occurs independently across
the characteristics.
One potential drawback of the proposed network model is the lack of dependence
on the number of friends. As a result, we observe a high variance in the number of
friends. While some individuals only have one network connection, others have very
many (the maximum in the plotted network is 32).
The outcome variables Sg and yg are constructed using equations (3.6) and (3.2)
respectively, with the coefficients:
γ1 = 0.05, γ2 = (1, 1, 0.5)
′, γ3 = (0.5, 0.5, 0.2)
′, γ4 = 0.8, α = (−2.8,−2.8)′,
β0 = (0, 0.8)
′, β1 = (0.5, 1)
′.
Under this construction an average of 55% of individuals undertake treatment and
the average value of Yg is 1.48, with a standard deviation of 2.01.
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Figure 1.1: Generated network using (3.15)
Table 1.1: Networks Summary
Property Mean S.D.
Number of Nodes 242.74 2.97
Number of Friendships 1659 140.42
Link Density 0.06 0.005
Average Degree 13.67 1.16
Clustering Coefficient 0.15 0.01
Number of Components 1.08 0.27
Average Path Length (of largest component) 2.62 0.08
Diameter (of largest component) 6.56 0.79
Number of Networks = 2
6.1 Exogeniety of Xg
As described in the estimation section above, we begin with the assumption that
Xg is strictly exogenous, i.e. E[X ′gu1g] = E[X ′gu0g] = 0 for all g. We present results
for the full model (model I), the model with no unobserved ξg term (model II) and
the model with no network effects (model III). Table 1.3 displays the estimates of
the network formation process for the full model. All estimates except θ4 in the
network formation are highly significant with the correct signs. θ1 and θ3 appear to
be overestimated, while θ4 and θ5 are underestimated. We would expect the network
in the previous period Dg− to be highly correlated with the characteristics Cg, so this
result is not surprising, and should not affect the estimation of the ξg parameters.
We note that the coefficients in the network formation and treatment equation (δ, γ4)
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Friends 614 (2.48%) 249 (1.01%)
Not Friends 790 (3.19%) 23100 (93.32%)
Table 1.3: Estimation in Network Formation
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate
θ1 0.2422*** θ4 0.1416*
(0.0180) (0.0810)
θ3,1 −0.8344*** θ5 0.0768***
(0.0207) (0.0228)




* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
absorb σξ (normalised to one in this construction).
Table 1.4 contains the estimates for the coefficients in the treatment equation.
As we are assuming a probit type specification, the variance is not identified. The
model with no network components, Model (III), performs poorly, especially when
identifying γ2,1. In general, the simplistic model underestimates the parameters.
Standard errors are relatively small, and all estimates are significant.
The intermediate model that does not include the unobserved ξg (Model II) of-
fers an improvement in the estimated coefficients, coupled with an increase in the
standard errors. In this case, only the coefficients on individuals’ characteristics and
the fixed effects are significant. None of the peer effect terms are significant due to
to high standard error estimates.
Moving to the full model (Model I) that now accounts for the presence of un-
observable peer effects in the estimation, we see some improvements. Firstly, the
endogenous effect estimate (γ1) has doubled in size compared to Model II and is
significant. The individual characteristic coefficient (α’s) estimates are relatively
30
unchanged, while the peer effects estimates (γ’s) have reduced in magnitude. The
standard error estimates have also decreased both set of variables, but the accuracy
of the estimates themselves seems close to Model II. In particular, the same individ-
ual characteristics are significant in both Model I and Model II. Endogenous effects
are significant at the 5% level, though exogenous effects remain insignificant. We
may be concerned with the coefficient of the unobserved terms, γ4, which in this
setup is positive, but not statistically significant to high standard error estimated,
probably due to a relatively small number of simulations.
Computational limits impede the ability to run the estimation with more iter-
ations or with a greater sample size. We run the 30 simulations in parallel on the
University of Adelaide’s Phoenix High Performance Computing service. The simu-
lations with two networks of size 250 recorded an average running time of 1 day, 14
hours. We note that while the results are reasonable, larger sample size and number
of iterations will improve the accuracy of the estimation.
The MTE for each model is plotted in Figure 1.2. The MTE curve in these figures
is calculated at the mean value of Xg (note that Xg is exogenous in this subsection).
The MTE is identified over the support of Pg which can be seen in Figure 1.3. We
see that low values of Xg are associated with low values of Pg. The more complex
models increasingly polarise the predicted propensities, so that propensities become
more highly correlated with the observed treatment. We identify the MTE at areas
where we have common support for Pg, i.e. when we observe values of Pg for both
S = 0 and S = 1. On average, Model (III) has support on the interval (0.0237,
0.8796), Model (II) has support on (0.0443,0.9633) and Model (I) has support over
(0.0536,0.9568). We see that the introduction of peer effects gives us a fairer spread
of propensities, allowing us to identify a greater portion of the MTE. The regions
of the MTE that are not identified are those areas of higher variance, corresponding
to the extreme values of the propensity scores. Estimation of traditional treatment
measures such as the average treatment effect (ATE) or treatment effect for the
treated (TT), require support over the entire [0,1] interval. As such, these measures
cannot be identified in the model (and rarely are: Carneiro et al. (2011)), making
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Table 1.4: Estimation of the Treatment Paramaters, Xg exogenous
Variable (I) (II) (III)
γ1 0.3624** 0.1893 -
(0.1810) (0.2422)
γ2,1 0.6262*** 0.6142*** 0.3773***
(0.0669) (0.0666) (0.0505)
γ2,2 0.6630*** 0.6642*** 0.4382***
(0.1809) (0.2114) (0.1251)
γ2,3 0.3127** 0.6918*** 0.3012***
(0.1405) (0.2145) (0.0551)
γ3,1 0.0553 0.2939 -
(0.1769) (0.2144)
γ3,2 −0.1306 0.2004 -
(0.2650) (0.5007)
γ3,3 −0.0090 0.1116 -
(0.2234) (0.3548)
γ4 0.1022 - -
(0.0810)
α1 −1.1579*** −1.7283*** −1.3130***
(0.2669) (0.3629) (0.1755)
α2 −1.1541*** −1.7146*** −1.3198***
(0.2773) (0.3781) (0.1594)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: Model (I) - full model with network formation process
Model (II) - excludes ξ and the network formation process
Model (III) - excludes all network terms.
the MTE and MPRTE more practical and relevant measures of the true treatment
effect.
The MTE is traced across values of US, corresponding to the quantiles of vg. A
high value of US corresponds to a low probability of treatment, while a low value of
US corresponds to a high probability of treatment. At a high value of US, individuals
at the margin have a corresponding high propensity score Pg. The MTE at this point
is defined as the expected increase in the outcome variable Yg when Pg is varied so
the individual is induced into treatment, starting at a high value of Pg. The converse
is true for a low value of US. In this construction of the model, we clearly see that a
high probability of treatment is associated with a high return to treatment (around
90% in each model), with the opposite observed for a low probability of treatment
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Model (III) Model (II)
Model (I)
Figure 1.2: MTE curve with 90% confidence bands
(around -90%).
MTE estimates in each model appear relatively similar. The model with the full
estimation appears to estimate slightly more extreme results for high and low values
of US, with the intermediate model splitting the results of the other two models.
Under the full model, the marginal treatment effect ranges from 0.89 for low US to
-1.1 for high US, compared to 0.8 and -0.7 for model (III). The shape of the curve
also differs, with model (I) showing a steeper, more convex curve. Most notably,
there is a progressive improvement in the width of the 90% confidence bands moving
towards the more robust model. In this case, there is evidence that the full network
model enables more precise identification of the true returns to treatment.
The mean line in the three plots in figure 1.2 are clearly downwards sloping so that
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(a) Model (III) (b) Model (III)
(c) Model (II) (d) Model (II)
(e) Model (I) (f) Model (I)
Figure 1.3: Support of Pg given Xg, support of Pg for S = 0 and S = 1
individuals self select into treatment. We can test the MTE curve for zero slope at
each point, as well as running a joint p-test for an overall constant slope as described
by Carneiro et al. (2011). The results of these tests are given in appendix table
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2.1. The MTE curve is statistically downwards sloping for the middle sections of the
MTE, from around 0.25 to 0.75. There is more variation at the ends of the MTE,
and we cannot statistically determine a negative slope. The p-value for a constant
slope across the whole MTE is 0.1333, so we cannot reject at the 90% level that
the overall slope of the MTE curve is non-constant. For the more simplistic models,
these p-values are clearly higher, and it is difficult to conclude a non-constant trend.
Table 1.5 reports the estimates of the MPRTE for the three different changes in
policy. The models involving network effects appear to estimate a higher marginal
policy effect for those induced into treatment. Using the more complex models we
have greater significance, with models (I) and (II) displaying lower standard errors
and achieving positive significance.
Table 1.5: MPRTE, Xg exogenous
Policy Change (I) (II) (III)
Zkα = Z
k + α 0.6797*** 0.6293** 0.4880
(0.2630) (0.2848) (0.3707)
Pα = P + α 0.6680** 0.6185** 0.4823
(0.2637) (0.2858) (0.3373)
Pα = (1 + α)P 0.5561*** 0.5219** 0.4209
(0.2083) (0.2303) (0.2940)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
6.2 Endogeniety of Xg
The tables and figures discussed thus far rely on the strong assumption that Xg and
Zg are both exogenous of the error terms (u0g, u1g, vg). This assumption would not
hold, for example, in a wage equation, where Xg represents educational achievement
or GPA. If unobserved ability is also important, Xg will not be exogenous.
Relaxing the assumption of the exogeneity of Xg, we examine the model un-
der weak endogeneity (corr(Xg, u1g) = corr(Xg, u0g) = 0.3) and strong endogeneity
(corr(Xg, u1g) = corr(Xg, u0g) = 0.75). Results in both cases reflect those in the case
where Xg is exogenous. In this case all coefficients are still exogenous of the treat-
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corr(Xg, U) = 0 corr(Xg, U) = 0.3
corr(Xg, U) = 0.75
Figure 1.4: MTE support, Model (I)
ment error vg, so endogeneity in the outcome will not have an effect. The estimation
of the MTE, however, will be affected. The MTE is plotted in appendix figures 2.1
and 2.2. Under this model the MTE curves will not be identified, and clearly in 2.1
and 2.2, the plotted MTE is not stable. Stronger endogeneity has greater effects on
the shape of the MTE, and completely removes the downwards slope we would like
to see.
In figures 1.4-1.6 we present the identification of the MTE when Xg is endogenous.
Identification is displayed in each of the models (I)-(III) respectively. When Xg is
held constant, we rely on the variation of the instruments Zg to achieve identification.
(INg−γ1Gg)−1Xg is held constant at its 25th and 75th percentile with each instrument
varied collectively and individually to produce the figures below. As in the MTE,
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corr(Xg, U) = 0 corr(Xg, U) = 0.3
corr(Xg, U) = 0.75
Figure 1.5: MTE support, Model (II)
we condition on (INg − γ1Gg)−1Xg(β1 − β0) as an approximation. The black lines
represent the portion of the MTE that is identified when Xg is endogenous and held
constant at its 25th and 75th percentile.
The dashed green line represents the sections of the MTE we do not identify.
The MTE is identified over the support of Pg when the instruments are varied. The
red line corresponds to this interval of Pg that is identified when all instruments are
allowed to vary. The lines above this correspond to the portion of the MTE identified
when a single instrument is allowed to vary and all other instruments are held at
their mean values. As Z1 is a binary variable, the support associated with varying Z1
are only single points in the black circles. The blue lines correspond to the portion
of the MTE identified when Z2 is allowed to vary.
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corr(Xg, U) = 0 corr(Xg, U) = 0.3
corr(Xg, U) = 0.75
Figure 1.6: MTE support, Model (III)
The higher order models gift us additional instruments for identification. The
exogenous network effects (GgZg) and unobserved effects (ξg) now act as instruments,
allowing greater variation in the collective instruments and achieving a greater region
of identification for the MTE. Of course, this relies on the assumption that Gg and
ξg are independent of (u0g, u1g). The shape of the MTE also appears to be affected.
The slope of the MTE under model (III) increases as the endogeneity increases.
This seems to indicate the inability of this simplistic model to identify the true MTE
once endogeneity is introduced. In the full model, however, the MTE maintains its
negative slope. The full model not only gives a more precise identification, but it
extends the range of identification as more instruments are added.
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7 Discussion
The results of the network formation process are encouraging. All terms, except θ4
are highly significant. The model generally performs well in estimating most of these
coefficients. We note that all coefficients attain the correct sign, particularly the
coefficient of the unobserved characteristics.
Comparing the results of the treatment equation, we see that the simple model
with no peer effects (model (III)), while having the lowest standard errors, is subject
to bias in its estimates. The simplistic model is problematic for two reasons. Firstly,
individual characteristics are correlated with the characteristics of their peers. By
omitting peer effects, these individual characteristics become endogenous. Secondly,
the simplistic model assumes standard normality of the error term. If the endogenous
effect is truly significant, then in the reduced form the error term will have variance
given by [(INg − γ1Gg)′(INg − γ1Gg)]−1. This will result in misidentification in the
simpler model, reflected in the underestimation of the coefficients in the treatment
equation.
While the increase in standard error moving to the peer effect models (models
(I) and (II)) may be initially concerning, we note that 1. standard errors are not
identified in this treatment equation and, 2. variance is dependent on the estimation
of the γ1 term, which also varies between samples. Another source of of variation
is generated in the addition of the N new parameters that must be estimated, ξg.
Each individual ξg is randomly generated, introducing considerable variation in each
sample, but reducing endogeneity bias. It is therefore surprising that moving from
model (II) to model (I), we observe a reduction in the standard error. Clearly
adequately controlling for endogeneity in unobserved characteristics is important in
improving the precision of the treatment estimation.
The introduction of peer effects and the network formation process allows us to
control for homophilic tendencies between individuals. The effect of homophily in the
network model is to polarise the sample. There are both direct and indirect effects
working here. Firstly, if individuals choose friendships based on a characteristic which
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also influences the probability of treatment; then the decision of these individuals
are likely to be correlated. Friends with shared characteristics will make similar
decisions. Thus, independent of any peer effect, the decisions of these individuals will
look similar. Exogenous and endogenous peer effects reinforce this. If an individual
has similar characteristics to their friends, then the exogenous effect of a friend
will reinforce the effect of the characteristic itself. Taking parental education as an
example; if an individual has college educated parents, they may choose friends who
also have college educated parents. Their friends will be more likely to enter college
due to the college education of their parents, influencing the individual directly
through the endogenous effect of similar decisions. The individual is also influenced
by the average characteristics of their peers, i.e. by the college education of their
friend’s parents. This exogenous effect will work in parallel, reinforcing the decision
of the individual to attend college. Thus the network model predicts more extreme
propensities as the peer effects reinforce individual characteristics.
Individuals who were initially likely to enter treatment, now are further incen-
tivised by the similarity of their friends, while those unlikely are further dissuaded.
We see evidence of this polarisation in both the MTE plots 1.2, and in the support
plots 1.3. We observe more extreme propensities in the support plots, as the pre-
dicted probabilities are emphasised by peer effects. As a result, the higher and lower
values of US will be more extreme, and we would expect more extreme returns at
the highest and lowest quantiles of vg. The fuller model more accurately accounts
for the reinforcement effects of peers, and predicts more polarised propensity scores
for individuals entering treatment. The model that does not account for ξg, while an
improvement on the basic model, does not adequately control for endogeneity in the
network and still underestimates the true effect. Thus introducing network effects
and adequately controlling for endogeneity in the network is critical when estimating
such a model.
The clear downwards slope in each of the MTE curves implies that the individual
selects into treatment based on their expected return, i.e. if you observe a low ex-
pected return to treatment, you will be unlikely to choose to enter into the treatment
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group. The improvement in the confidence bands is most notable. Even with the
greater standard errors in the treatment equation, the fuller models have narrower
confidence bands when we estimate the MTE and MPRTE.
While the full model improves the confidence interval for the MTE, the width
still may be of concern. This can partly be attributed to the difficulties in using
non-parametric estimation for smaller datasets (we would expect these to narrow
with sufficient sample size). The fuller model does, however, cause estimation of the
MTE to become both more accurate and more extreme.
The positive MPRTE in the estimation implies that individuals induced into
treatment would attain positive returns from doing so. This holds for all types of
marginal policy changes, whether a direct increase in propensity or an increase in
the instruments, although increasing propensities multiplicatively appears to result
in the smallest return. The peer effect model estimates a higher return to these
marginal policy changes. The model predicts that those at the margin are now more
likely to attain higher returns. Homophily appears to work positively in this case,
such that those who should obtain treatment have already done so, and those with
negative returns are dissuaded from entering treatment. Those at the margin have
more moderate characteristics and are therefore likely to receive higher returns from
entering treatment than that predicted by a non-peer effect model.
We also note that as the peer effects are functioning as instruments in the model,
these MPRTE values indicate that an increase in peer effects would also result in
positive returns for those induced into treatment by this change. Peer effects can
be used as a tool in this case by policy makers to encourage treatment, leading to
positive returns.
Turning to the results of the endogenous estimation, we see that the proposed
model performs well in comparison to models (II) and (III). In this setting (holding
Xg fixed and creating identification through the variation in instruments), the net-
work paramaters act as additional instruments. Exogenous peer effect terms are less
useful than the non-peer instruments. Exogenous peer effects are simply averages of
the original individual characteristics and therefore exhibit less variation than the
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characteristics themselves (Xg has an average standard deviation of approximately
1.4, while GgXg has an average standard deviation of of 0.6). The parameter which
is of some use is the unobserved peer characteristics. In particular, these charac-
teristics generally do not have a high correlation with the other variables, and vary
considerably between individuals, independent of the outcome. As a result, these
unobserved characteristics are particularly effective instruments.
We must acknowledge the limitations in the specification of the proposed network
model. It is unlikely that the network model accurately reflects the network formation
process, though it should be sufficient to identify most of the unobserved component
and it certainly offers an improvement on neglecting these effects. The assumption
that individuals are either close in observed or unobserved characteristics is a strong
one. In reality, friendship formation is difficult to model and is reliant on many
unobserved, intangible factors, including significant randomness which is unlikely to
adhere to any normality assumptions.
In our model we assume that peer effects only influence the binary treatment
decision, exogenous of the outcome. It is trivial to include exogenous peer effects
in the outcome equation, as long as these terms are truly exogenous. Introducing
endogenous and unobserved effects is a more complex process. The non-linearity of
the outcome equation complicates the Bayesian estimation, and while theoretically
possible, we do not include such an extension here.
In conclusion, the addition of peer effects is important in correcting for potential
endogeneity in the model. The introduction of the network formation process allows
us to correct for homophily in characteristics and as a result, we observe more po-
larised estimates in the MTE, and larger estimates for the returns to policy changes.
Estimates of the MTE and MPRTE become more accurate and more precise. Fur-
thermore, the peer effect components can act as additional instruments, which is




Application to High-School Networks
and College Attainment Decision
1 Introduction
High schools act as incubators of peer effects; creating an environment where strong
friendship connections are established, and social norms are firmly enforced. Sig-
nificant spillovers in achievement and other outcomes are easily observable between
students. As a result, the classroom has become a popular area for peer effect anal-
ysis. Sacerdote et al. (2011) summarises the burgeoning literature on peer effects
in education. The literature demonstrates strong evidence of the importance and
strength of peer effects, especially regarding social outcomes such as delinquent be-
haviour. When considering peer effects in achievement, the exogenous effect of peer
background is moderate. Estimates of the endogenous effect are mixed, but are
generally moderate to large.
In this application, we are concerned with the peer effect of high school students
on the decision to attend college, and the indirect effect this has on wages. The liter-
ature generally supports the hypothesis of positive peer effects on college attendance
and future wages.
Even in high school, the networks an individual finds themselves in are likely
to influence future wages. The common adage that getting a job is more about
This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris
and designed by J. Richard Udry, Peter S. Bearman, and Kathleen Mullan Harris at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from the Eunice Kennedy
Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from
23 other federal agencies and foundations. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and
Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design. Information on how to obtain the Add Health
data files is available on the Add Health website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No direct
support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
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who you know than what you know seems to hold elements of truth. Considering
peer effects, Kramarz and Skans (2014) find that the parents of classmates are an
important determinant of where an individual finds employment. Similarly, Black
et al. (2013) find that the average paternal income of one’s high school peers has a
small exogenous peer effect on the future wage of the individual. In contrast, Bifulco
et al. (2014) find little evidence of persistent peer effects on wages, but suggest that
the exogenous effect of having peers with college educated mothers is positive and
significant. Furthermore, they find that the delay in college education due to the
decision of peers not to attend college has a temporary effect on wages. Taking
networks as a proxy for social adeptness, Galeotti and Mueller (2005) and Barbone
and Dolton (2015) find that the social skills associated with network position in high
school lead to a significant increase in future earnings.
Evidence of the influence of peers on the decision to attend college is more wide-
spread. Bifulco et al. (2011) find that peers with college educated mothers create a
positive exogenous peer effect on the probability of attending college and reduce the
likelihood of dropping out of high school. Fletcher (2012b) and Wu (2015) focus on
the exogenous peer effect of college decisions, both finding strong social influence of
friendship networks on the likelihood of college enrolment and college preferences.
Fletcher (2013) finds that an increase in classmates attending college by 10% leads to
an increase in the probability of an individual attending college by a significant 2-3%.
De Giorgi et al. (2010) find a significant peer effect on the college major decided by
students when at college, which influence both academic achievement outcomes and
entry wages.
College educated individuals earn significantly more than those with only high
school education. According to the OECD (2016), the increase in earnings in 25
OECD countries from a bachelors level degree is around 48%. As we have already
explored, both endogenous and exogenous peer effects play an important role in
determining the decision to attend college. Clearly, if peers are playing an important
role in determining which students are attending college, there will be a corresponding
influence on wage outcomes. The result mentioned of Bifulco et al. (2014), provides
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positive evidence for this indirect college effect. Following a similar intuition, we
utilise the model presented in chapter 1 to estimate the role of high school peers in
the returns to education.
High school networks hold significant potential in the dissemination of knowledge
and the effectiveness of policy. In addition to the obvious impacts of networks (such
as social multiplier effects), other more subtle network-based phenomena may be
pertinent to education policy changes. For example, changes in social norms have
been shown to significantly affect student achievement through intra-school networks
and the learning of these social norms. Del Bello et al. (2015) argue that policies that
utilise the networks within a school, particularly focused on social norms, are highly
effective compared to neighbourhood based policy changes. As evidence, Kremer
et al. (2009) show that the introduction of scholarships for some high school students
can affect all students in the school, even those ineligible or unlikely to attain the
scholarship. Therefore, the effect of networks and peer groups should be considered
when education policy is enacted. As such, we use the approach of Carneiro et al.
(2011) to estimate the potential effect of networks on policy changes in our model
and in the Add-Health data set.
In what follows, we apply the model presented in chapter 1 to a dataset containing
the networks of high school students. We measure the marginal returns to education
these individuals receive, when networks influence the decision of students to attend
college. We examine the role these networks play in the treatment decision and on
the marginal returns to education. We then demonstrate and discuss the influence
these networks hold on changes to policy in the education setting.
2 Data Description
The Add Health Dataset is a longitudinal study across high schools in the US. Surveys
were conducted for 90,118 individuals in school years 7-12 in representative high
schools during the 1994-1995 school year. A core sample of 20,745 students were
selected to take part in a detailed in-home survey across four waves; wave I: 1994-
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1995, wave II: 1996, wave III: 2001-2002 and wave IV: 2008. A saturated sample
comprised 16 schools, where all students in the school were selected were selected for
this core sample. These 16 heterogeneous schools included two large schools (total
enrolment in excess of 3100) and 14 smaller school (enrolment fewer than 300 each).
One of the large schools is located in a mid-sized town with a predominantly white
enrolment, while the other is located in a metropolitan area and is ethnically diverse.
The smaller schools are a mix of public and private schools located in rural and urban
areas. In waves I and II, students were asked to name up to 10 of their closest friends
(5 male, 5 female). We use these friendship rosters to construct high school networks
in waves I and II. Friendships named outside of the selected school are excluded, as
these individuals are not in the sample.
Wave II responses are used to construct most variables for the treatment and out-
come equations, while observed wages and some contextual variables are collected
from wave IV. Individuals who did not take part in all of waves I, II and IV are
removed from the sample. We also remove individuals with no friendship nomina-
tions (409 individuals) as they experience no measurable peer effect. After removing
individuals with incomplete data or no friends we have a total sample of N = 1696
observations across g = 15 schools. Due to the high computational capacity required
for estimation of large networks, we limit estimation to the 13 smaller schools with a
total sample size of N = 631. Using the University of Adelaide’s Phoenix High Per-
formance Computing service, estimation of these 13 networks takes approximately 23
hours. The larger networks take over a week to estimate, so results are not reported
here. It is difficult to obtain many iterations across such a time horizon, so standard
errors cannot be estimated without greater computational capacity.
Summary statistics are given in table 2.3. Descriptions of the variables can be
found in figure 2.4. Network properties are given in table 2.1. Figure 2.1 displays
the networks of two schools in our sample. On average, individuals in the network
have 3.85 friends. Only two networks are completely connected, but most have a
large component dominating the network. The network statistics reflect the small
size of the schools; link density is comparatively high while average path length and
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diameter are smaller. Each individual is on average 3.68 links away from anyone
in their network, with a maximum distance of 9.08 per network. Friends tend to
cluster together, with few connections across the network. The clustering coefficient
indicates that just over a third of possible triplets are closed, i.e. you are likely to
be connected with your friend’s friends. This pattern is clear in the second graph in
figure 2.1, with evidence of three distinct groups. Table 2.2 gives a transition matrix
of friendships from period 0 to period 1. Less than half of friendships in period 0
are still present in the next period. In fact, the number of new friendships is not far
below the number of existing friendships transferred from period 0.
Figure 2.1: School networks
Table 2.1: Networks Summary
Property Mean S.D.
Number of Nodes 48.54 26.19
Number of Friendships 93.77 58.08
Link Density 0.11 0.08
Average Degree 3.85 1.02
Clustering Coefficient 0.35 0.14
Number of Components 2.30 1.55
Average Path Length (of largest component) 3.68 0.91
Diameter (of largest component) 9.08 2.63
Number of Networks = 13
As with most survey data, we must be careful when interpreting the results due
to the potential effect of measurement error. In particular, self reported variables
such as wage and subject grade are liable to misreporting or unconscious bias. How-
ever, most variables we are concerned with are easily verifiable (race, gender, college
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Friends 661 (3.52%) 726 (3.86%)
Not Friends 558 (2.97%) 16860 (89.66%)
decision). We assume that the sample covers the majority of in-school friendships.
While the survey restricts students to naming 10 close friends, only one student in
our sample reaches this limit.
As in chapter 1, we treat friendships as a binary relation and normalise the
network so that the average peer effect is equal for every individual regardless of the
number of friends. Each of an individual’s friends are given equal weight. These
are necessary and reasonable simplifications of the true friendship network, but as a
result, estimates may underestimate the true influence of peer effects.
The variables Xg, Yg and Zg are defined in table 2.4. We take the levels of all
variables, except wage and local income, for which logs are taken. We use terms of
order one, without interactions in each variable for simplicity. The instruments in
the treatment equation are number of siblings, innovations in local labour market
variables and the proportion of college education in the local area. As in Carneiro
et al. (2011), we utilise innovations in labour market area statistics. Specifically
we use local income in 1990 and local unemployment in 1993, observed around the
time of the first wave. If unemployment is higher than normal and wages are lower,
the individual will be more likely to pursue further education rather than enter the
labour force directly. Xg contains local income and unemployment in 2008, when
wage is observed, to control for long term labour market conditions in the area. The
use of these instruments is discussed in Cameron and Heckman (1998), Cameron and
Heckman (2001) and Cameron and Taber (2004), who follow a similar procedure in
estimating the returns to education. Independent of local labour market conditions,
the proportion of college education in the local area will clearly affect the decision
to attend college, but should not impact on resulting wages. Similarly, we expect
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number of siblings to influence the likelihood of attending college, but not observed
wage in the long run.
Table 2.3: Data Summary
Variable Name Min Max Mean SD
Wage Yg ($) 0 300000 30386 27531
College Attendance S 0 1 0.71 0.45
Age (months) 130 222 162.1 18.92
Male 0 1 0.47 0.50
Female 0 1 0.53 0.50
Race:
White 0 1 0.84 0.36
Black 0 1 0.14 0.35
Other race 0 1 0.05 0.22
Mother’s education:
High School 0 1 0.46 0.50
College 0 1 0.39 0.49
Less than High School 0 1 0.10 0.30
Father’s education:
High School 0 1 0.33 0.48
College 0 1 0.35 0.47
Less than High School 0 1 0.11 0.31
Grade in Maths 0 4 2.54 1.34
Grade in English 0 4 2.84 1.14
Appearance 1 5 3.65 0.78
Shy 1 5 3.31 1.26
Independent 1 5 1.80 0.76
Instruments:
Number of siblings 0 14 2.59 1.99
Local income 1990 3817 28501 11155 4090
Local unem. 1993 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.02
College ed. 1990 0.03 0.48 0.18 0.11
Variables in Xg only:
Local income 2008 8500 94950 23419 10230
Local unem. 2008 0 0.35 0.07 0.04
Married 0 1 0.55 0.50
Number of Children 0 5 0.90 1.08
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Earnings reported at wave IV (Individuals who do not
report exact earnings are asked to report earnings within
a range of values. We take the mid-value of this range.)
Treatment variable Sg,
college attendance
Dummy variable indicating education level is at least
some college
Variables in Xg and Zg
Age Age of participant at the time of the first wave (1993)
Female Dummy variable indicating female, male
Race Dummy variables indicating white, black or other race
School Dummy variable indicating the school of the respondent
Mother’s Education Dummy variables indicating the respondent’s mother 1.graduated high school and 2. attended college
Father’s Education Dummy variables indicating the respondent’s father 1.graduated high school and 2. attended college
GPA Sum of reported grades in Mathematics and English;A=4, B=3, C=2, D=1, no grade=0
Appearance Response from the surveyor on a Likert scale to thequestion “How physically attractive is the respondent?”
Personality variables
Variables on a Likert scale for Shyness and Indepen-
dence (E.g. Response to the question “How much do
you agree with the statement ‘You are Shy.’”
Variables in Zg, not Xg
Number of Siblings Variable of the number of reported siblings
Local income at wave II Income per capita at the local tract area level in 1990
Local unemployment at
wave II Unemployment at the local tract area level in 1990
Local proportion with a
college degree at wave II
Proportion of residents over 25 who hold a bachelor de-
gree or higher, taken at the local tract area level
Variables in Xg, not Zg
Married Dummy variable indicating if the respondent has everbeen married
Number of Kids Variable of the number of reported children
Local income at wave
IV Income per capita at the local tract area level in 2008
Local unemployment at
wave IV Unemployment at the local tract area level in 2008
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3 Results
We follow the model and estimation method proposed in chapter 1 to estimate the
treatment, outcome and returns to education (Model I). We run the MCMC pro-
cedure t = 30000 times, discarding the first 20000 iterations. To obtain standard
errors, we repeat this process R = 30 times. We compare these results to those
derived from the model with no network components (Model III). In this case we
bootstrap the sample to obtain standard errors.
Table 2.5 presents the results of the network formation process for the full model.
Most terms, except those in Cg,i are significant. Characteristics such as shyness or
independence do not statistically determine the number of friends an individual has.
The homophily effects all prove to be important in the model. In particular, individ-
uals select friendships based on similarity in age, race, gender, parent’s education,
GPA and even appearance. Having been friends in the previous period, or having
friends in common in the previous period are particularly strong determinants of
friendship formation. Similarity in unobserved characteristics has a negative effect
on friendship choices. While this effect is reasonably large, it is not highly significant
in this estimation.
Table 2.6 presents the results of the estimation of the treatment equation. Again
most terms are significant. Individual effects are all highly significant, with race, gen-
der and parent’s education relatively important. Most of the corresponding exoge-
nous effects are significant, particularly having college educated parents and having
friends with a higher GPA. Although being black has a positive effect on treatment,
having black friends appears to negatively impact the decision to attend college.
The effect of unobserved characteristics, ξg is small but significant. Three of our
instruments are significant; number of siblings and proportion of college education
positively influence the college decision. Local income has a strong negative effect,
as we would predict.
The results of the model with no peer effects are in table 2.7. Most estimates for
the coefficients of Xg are comparable, with some appearing to absorb the peer effects
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Table 2.5: High School Network Estimation
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate





No. of Siblings −0.0189 (0.0142)
(0.0224) White 0.4123***
Cg,ij (0.1179)
|Ageg,i − Ageg,j| −0.4687*** Black 0.4494***
(0.0076) (0.0836)
|GPAg,i −GPAg,j| −0.0641*** Gg− 2.0982***
(0.0038) (0.1251)
|APERg,i − APERg,j| −0.0665*** Fg− 0.3973***
(0.0159) (0.0394)
Father: No School −0.2923*** |ξg,i − ξg,j| −1.1199*
(0.1117) (0.6533)
Father: High School −0.0540***
(0.0197)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
of the full model. However, estimates of the instruments are considerably reduced,
while the fixed effects are much lower. The variances in the base model are high,
particularly for the fixed effects.
As in Carneiro et al. (2011), we divide the MTE by four to obtain annualised
estimates. The result in figure 2.2 is quite striking. Those with low values of US
(and a high probability of attending college) have a high return (49.5%), while those
with high values of US have a negative return (−72%). A 49.5% return indicates
that these individuals would expect to have a wage 49.5% higher if they attended
college than if they didn’t attend college. The MTE is identified over the range
(0.1063,0.9695), where it has common support, while the base model is identified
over the region (0.1435,0.9729). The two models are comparable at low values of US,
although neither are identified in this region. At high US, the full model predicts
a less negative return. The confidence bands for the MTE are much wider for the
basic model, as we saw in chapter 1. We test the difference in LATE’s for a negative
slope. The p-values in table 2.2 demonstrate an undeniably downwards slope at each
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Table 2.6: High School Treatment Estimation
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate
Endogenous effect −0.0271** GPA 0.0830***
(0.0124) (0.0028)
Female 0.3779*** ξg 0.0593***
(0.0043) (0.0136)
White 0.1695*** Fixed Effects
(0.0104) School 1 −0.1640***
Black 0.3422*** (0.0069)
(0.0124) School 2 0.0129***
Parents: High School 0.0450*** (0.0058)
(0.0046) School 3 −0.4094***
Parents: College 0.7959*** (0.0077)
(0.0041) School 4 −0.4111***
GPA 0.1225*** (0.0090)
(0.0009) School 5 0.3157***
No. of Siblings 0.0027*** (0.0095)
(0.0012) School 6 −0.0263***
Income 1990 −0.2027*** (0.0086)
(0.0033) School 7 −0.4915***
Unemployment 1993 0.0044*** (0.0088)
(0.0086) School 8 −0.0773***
College Prop 1990 0.5045*** (0.0169)
(0.0108) School 9 0.0920***
Exogenous Effects (0.0106)
Female 0.0496*** School 10 0.2663***
(0.0094) (0.0065)
White 0.1161*** School 11 0.2387***
(0.0127) (0.0115)
Black −0.2448*** School 12 0.1207***
(0.0220) (0.0124)




* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
point of the MTE. Clearly individuals are self-selecting into college in this model,
with those who are likely to attend college receiving much higher returns.
The support for the propensity scores, Pg, can be seen in figure 2.3. As expected,
we see that at low values of Xg, we observe most support at low values of Pg.
Conversely, high values of Xg are associated with high propensity scores. In figure
2.3b we see that, largely, the model correctly assigns high propensity scores to those
who attend college. Those who don’t attend college have a more diverse spread of
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Table 2.7: High School Treatment Estimation: No Networks
Variable Estimate Variable Estimate
Female 0.3537** School 4 −2.2977
(0.1568) (5.0353)
White 0.3126 School 5 −1.4049
(0.5606) (5.0171)
Black 0.2732 School 6 −1.7360
(0.5572) (5.0526)
Parents: High School 0.1084 School 7 −2.4233
(0.1569) (5.0636)
Parents: College 0.7982*** School 8 −1.7595
(0.1685) (4.7392)
GPA 0.1267*** School 9 −1.8119
(0.0321) (5.0316)
No. of Siblings 0.0090 School 10 −1.6826
(0.0384) (5.0952)
Income 1990 0.0979 School 11 −1.5257
(0.5652) (5.1571)
College Prop 1990 0.0486 School 12 −1.6394
(1.5111) (5.1949)
Fixed Effects School 13 −1.3898






* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
propensities, but most weight is given under 0.5.
We see similar results for the base model. The base model generally assigns low
Pg values to low Xg values, but in figure 2.3c, we see a tendency to assign high Pg
values across a range of Xg values. Figure 2.3d shows that the base model is slightly
worse at separating those who attend college and those who do not, with fewer low
propensities assigned.
Table 2.8 describes the results of the MPRTE for the high school networks. As
in the MTE, we observe high returns in each case. Those induced into treatment
by a small change in policy, receive a return of around 35%. This is similar for
both the case when we increase the instruments or increase propensity additively.
The return is slightly reduced if propensity is multiplicatively increased. As our
exogenous effects are effectively used as instruments, we can conclude that a marginal
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(a) Full Model (b) Base Model
Figure 2.2: MTE for the returns to college education
(a) Support of Pg given Xg (b) Support of Pg given S = 1, 0
(c) Support of Pg given Xg - no networks
(d) Support of Pg given S = 1, 0 - no net-
works
Figure 2.3: Support for high school network data
increase in the exogenous peer effect will lead to a positive return to those induced
into attending college. The base model policy effects are more muted. Those induced
to attend college by a change in policy are predicted to receive a 20% increase in
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wage, although the standard error of this estimate is reasonably high.
Table 2.8: MPRTE in High School Networks
Policy Change Model with Networks Model without networks
Zkα = Z
k + α 0.3503*** 0.2095
(0.0606) (0.2663)
Pα = P + α 0.3519*** 0.1956
(0.0610) (0.2579)
Pα = (1 + α)P 0.2764*** 0.0828
(0.0531) (0.2057)
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
We can also directly measure the effect of other changes in our model. In particu-
lar, we can measure the effect of an increase or decrease in particular characteristics.
For example, if we increase the college education of every 5th student’s parents by
10%, we observe a treatment effect of 34.64% with a standard error of 21.68%.
Relaxing the assumption of the exogeniety of Xg we obtain figure 2.4. The three
labour market variables and ξg, functioning as instruments are allowed to vary as Xg
is held constant. In this case, it appears the strength of the instruments in identifying
the MTE is low. We identify the black portion of the MTE curve only. We see in
figure 2.3 that most propensities are clustered around 0.8. This corresponds to the
portion of the MTE identified in the model when Xg is endogenous. The MTE is still
downwards sloping in these regions. The MTE has drastically different intercepts
depending on the value we hold Xg at. This is to be expected, given the number
of variables in Xg in comparison to the number of instruments included. Including
exogenous peer effects as instruments gives us the result in 2.4a.
In comparison, the base model has fewer instruments and as a result identifies a
slightly smaller region for identification in this endogenous setting. The ξg variable
and the exogenous peer effects offer greater variation in instruments, though this
improvement is not dramatic in this case.
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(a) Full Model (b) No Networks
Figure 2.4: College Network Under Endogeneity
4 Discussion
Comparing the two models presented above, we see, in general, that the peer effect
model produces results with a smaller variance and greater identification. In the
treatment equation, most individual effects have similar estimates. It appears that
in the base model some of the exogenous effects are absorbed into the individual
characteristics. The greatest difference in the treatment estimates lies in the fixed
effects. The basic model predicts lower fixed effects than the full model. The standard
errors in the full model are considerably smaller, particularly for the fixed effect
terms.
Results in the MTE are similar between the models, with the full model displaying
a less negative return for higher values of US. The confidence bands for the full model
are much smaller, as in chapter 1. The most notable difference is in the MPRTE.
The full model predicts a significantly higher return for those affected by changes in
policy. This may be due to the prediction of propensities clustered largely above 0.5,
corresponding to the region where the full model predicts higher returns to education.
Thus most individuals at the margin will experience a higher predicted return under
the peer effect model. In addition, we observe a lower MPRTE variance in the peer
effect model.
In addition to the changes noted above, introducing peer effects allows us to
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achieve a greater range of identification in both the case when Xg is exogenous and
when Xg is endogenous. In the exogenous case, we identify the MTE at slightly
lower values of US, according to figure 2.3. In the endogenous case, the addition of
peer effects allows us additional instruments for identification. As in figure 2.4, we
identify a greater range across the MTE, as the additional instruments allow more
variation when Xg is held constant.
The proposed peer effect model is unique in its ability to control for homophily
in observed and unobserved characteristics. In the network model, we note strong
homophily in several dimensions including age, GPA, appearance, parental educa-
tion, gender and race. High school students appear to select strongest across age and
race. While the age affect is unsurprising (students are grouped into classes by age),
the lack of racial crossover may be more concerning. We find modest but significant
effects for GPA and appearance i.e. students select friends based on similarity in ap-
pearance and achievement. Males are more likely to nominate friendships with other
males, while the homophily of females is somewhat weaker. Students with fathers
who did not finish high school are less likely to become friends with similar students.
This may, however, just be an indication that these students make less friends in
general. Students with college educated fathers do tend to cluster together.
Homophily, by definition, groups individuals together so that we observe similar
outcomes and similar decisions across segments of the population. While homophily
often works against those on the negative side of the distribution, in our setting the
effect of homophily is largely positive. In fact, it may be possible for policy mak-
ers to use homophily as an instrument to achieve positive outcomes. Many of the
characteristics in which homophily is displayed; gender, race, parental education and
GPA, strongly influence the probability that a student decides to enrol in college.
The result of such homophily is to reinforce the decision of the student. As discussed
in chapter 1, this reinforcement occurs through both endogenous and exogenous peer
effects. As students select friends based on similarity in characteristics, characteris-
tics encouraging college attendance will be reinforced by positive exogenous effects
and the increased likelihood that their friend will also attend college (endogenous
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effects).
Given the evidence that individuals self-select into college based on their returns,
homophily assists in allocating students to the decision which results in the highest
return. Those who should attend college (who would obtain a positive return) are
now encouraged to do so, while those unlikely to attend college (who would experience
negative returns) are further dissuaded. This does, however, leave some individuals
somewhat entrenched. If a student is surrounded by other students unlikely to attend
college, the probability they will separate from their friends in the college decision is
low, even if positive returns are possible.
From a policy standpoint, homophily makes it easier to target certain groups of
individuals. If policy makers want to assist one particular racial group, homophily
and peer effects can work in tandem to magnify these policy effects, and spread
them across the peer group. Changing the social norms in a large group, however, is
usually a difficult prospect and requires a critical mass to shift the direction of the
peer effect.
Turning to the results of the treatment equation, we note that most coefficients
are significant. Race, gender and parental education all prove to be especially im-
portant in determining the likelihood of attending college. GPA is less important
but still significant. Each of our instruments are significant, though number of sib-
lings is a weak determinant of attendance in college. As expected, lower income
and higher college attendance in the local area positively influence the likelihood of
college enrolment. Most of our exogenous effects are also significant. Considering
exogenous effects, having white friends and having female friends positively influence
the probability of treatment. Similarly if friends have a higher GPA, or have college
educated parents they will be more likely to attend college. Having black friends ap-
pears to reduce the probability of college attendance, though being black is a strong
positive influence on the probability of treatment. This may be a product of multi-
collinearity between individual and peer characteristics, given the racial homophily
we have already noted. The base model predicts a similar positive result of black
students on college attendance. In this sample, black and white students dominate
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the sample and are more likely to attend college than those of other races (mostly
Hispanic and Asian in our sample). The much investigated disparity between black
and white students is not prevalent in our sample. In fact, black students appear to
have higher college attendance and higher average wage than white students (French
et al. (2015) find and discuss a similar result in the Add-Health data). Being female
significantly increases the probability of attending college, a result which has been
well documented. Much research has discussed the factors underlying this reversal
of the gender gap including the effects of childhood neighbourhood and environment
(Chetty et al., 2016), teaching style (Dee, 2005) and school quality (Figlio et al.,
2016). The effect of GPA on college attendance is only small, although the effects
are accompanied by an associated small exogenous effect of peer GPA.
The presence of college educated parents is the strongest indicator of college
education, accompanied by a strong exogenous peer effect of having college edu-
cated parents. A social norm effect can be asserted: students who are accustomed
to interacting with those who have previously attended college, whether their par-
ents, or friend’s parents, are themselves likely to enter college. Being surrounded
by highly educated individuals creates expectations for the individual of their col-
lege enrolment. Students who only have experience with college education conclude
that further education is the required norm, while those who interact only with non-
college educated individuals are less likely to anticipate a college future. We do not,
however, find evidence of a positive endogenous effect. The direct effect of friend’s
intentions to attend college is irrelevant, having controlled for all other individual
and peer factors. Thus having friend’s with college educated parents is much more
important than having friends who plan on attending college themselves. These find-
ings may be particularly pertinent in a policy setting. Students must view college
education as a viable option. Interaction with people who have attended college
allows college education to appear more realistic, or more normal, with the benefits
of college education more directly observable. Social norms are a strong mechanism
to encourage certain individual decisions and behaviours. Policies that exploit social
norms can be particularly effective (Del Bello et al., 2015). One other possible ex-
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planation for the insignificance of peer effects is that the endogenous effect is simply
absorbed by several of the exogenous effects, which influence the likelihood that both
the individual and the peer will attend college.
Given the significance of the peer effect terms (particularly exogenous peer effects)
in the treatment model, and the positive returns associated with policy changes,
consideration of peer effects is likely to enhance education policy strategies. If policy
works to increase any of the discussed characteristics within a school, then benefits
may spread across the network through the social multiplier effect. Peer effects can
be used as an instrument to implement change or to improve the effectiveness of
policy.
The MTE curve demonstrates strong evidence of self selection into college. Those
with high probability of attending college benefit greatly from doing so, while those
unlikely to attend would achieve a very low return if they did. The data in this case
may represent an extreme sample. Taking simple averages, those who attend college
have a mean observed wage 93.29% higher than those who do not attend college.
Thus, those along the extremes would expect to achieve a dramatic differential in
wage depending on their choice to attend college. It is worth asking the question why
returns are lower for individuals who are unlikely to attend college. Choice of college
or college major may be one factor, so that even if these individuals do attend college,
they are either unable or unlikely to enrol in college courses which would increase
their returns. If this were indeed the key issue, then encouraging college attendance
for all students would not be enough to increase their returns; selection of college
and college major, and the probability of success within this degree would be an
important consideration.
Endogeneity in the Xg variables proves difficult to manage when estimating the
MTE. We only identify a small section of the MTE curve, when Xg is held con-
stant. This problem would be mitigated under the presence of stronger instruments,
uncorrelated with the regressors in the outcome equation. As noted, however, peer
effects do afford additional variation, particularly in the unobserved ξg effects. The
estimation in this case is limited by the small sample size. Only 13 smaller schools
61
are available here, and may not be representative of the true population of schools in
the US. A larger sample size would allow more accurate estimation of the nonlinear
outcome equation, and would provide increased variation in parameters for greater
identification.
The MPRTE in each case is positive, such that those influenced by policy changes
would receive positive returns from attending college. Thus any change in policy is
generally constructive, including changes in the peer effect. Given the importance
of peer effects in the college decision, peer effects provide a useful tool to encourage
college attendance.
The estimation is potentially distorted by the structure of the data. Due to the
limitations of the survey, we cannot map friendships outside of the school. This
means that modelled friendships are only a subset of the true friendships and our
estimates of peer effects are likely to underestimate the true peer effect. We have
already discussed the important role of parents and friend’s parents in the peer effect,
so we would expect other individuals outside the school to also contribute to the peer
effect. In addition, removing individuals with no named friends from the sample may
also affect the results. It is difficult to know the net impact of this omission without
further investigation. We would still expect friendless students to be subject to some
peer effect, whether in relationships outside of the school, or with unlisted classmates.
It is likely this peer effect would be weaker than the one measured within the school.
Those deleted from the sample went to college less often and received a lower wage
on average, although returns to college were higher for these individuals. Of those
deleted from the sample, 62.6% went to college, receiving an average wage of $31942
and a return to education of 1.58 (compared to 69.34%, $34159 and 1.29 for those
in sample). We may conclude, therefore, that removing these individuals from the
sample causes returns to be underestimated.
We noted that friendships were generally transient in the data sample. Almost
50% of friendships from one period were not transferred to the next. We can either
attribute this high number to measurement error, such that individuals were not
complete in their recording of friendships from one period to the next, or conclude
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that most friendships are generally short-lived at this stage of high school. This is
surprising given the significance of the peer effects we have found in the decision
to attend college. One explanation may be that friendships observed in the first
period are observed earlier in high school, when students are adjusting to the new
environment of high school and making many new friends. By the time we record
period 1 friendships, these friendships may carry a greater weight and be more stable
over time. This may also lead to the conclusion that the peer effect is not equally
weighted over a student’s friends. More stable, deeper friendships may hold a greater
weight in the decision making processes of students. The peer effect we found may be
distributed more heavily over a closer group of friends rather than being an average
of the reported friendship roster of the individual. One could place weights on the
order of the friendship roster to test this hypothesis.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model to enable the incorporation of peer effects into a stan-
dard treatment effects framework. We explore identification within this model and
present a Bayesian estimation method. The model is tested using a Monte Carlo
experiment and applied to a data-set of high school students.
We find that the inclusion of peer effects allows wider identification and greater
accuracy in estimation. Without controlling for peer effects in a model where peer
effects are important, estimates will be biased. The inclusion of peer effect terms
provides us with useful instruments for estimation and allows a greater range of
identification when Xg is both exogenous and endogenous. Our model obtains more
accurate measures of the marginal treatment effect and reduces the associated stan-
dard error.
We adjust for unobserved peer effect terms by including a network formation
model. The proposed network formation model relies on homophily, where individ-
uals select friendships based on similarity in characteristics for identification. Ho-
mophily plays a strong role in the estimation, increasing the size of propensity scores
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in the model, increasing returns at each quantile and allowing stronger identification.
In our data section, we find that peer effects are significant in the treatment equa-
tion. There is evidence that peers play an important role in the decision to attend
college. Homophily in friendship selection is strong and prevalent, and controlling
for unobserved characteristics is important in preventing the problems associated
with homophily. The inclusion of peer effects is important from a policy analysis
perspective. Peer effects can either distort policy intentions or promote the diffu-
sion of the benefits of a policy across the network. Peer effects can be directly used
as a policy instrument. We find that when peer effects are increased in the college
decision process, those students induced to attend college benefit from doing so. Fur-
thermore, when we increase some characteristic in a school, such as the proportion
of college educated parents, the student benefits not only from the increase in their
own parent’s education, but also from the increase in friend’s parents education, and
the increase in probability that their friends will now attend college.
The proposed model can be used in settings where peers affect the binary treat-
ment decision of an individual, independent of a continuous outcome. We have
explored the setting where peers influence the decision of an individual to attend
college, independent of an observed future wage outcome. Other possible settings
could explore binary decisions such as the decision to smoke, the decision to en-
gage in delinquent behaviour or the decision to marry. Associated outcomes may
be continuous health or economic related outcomes, independent of the original peer
effect.
The peer effect treatment model presented here, allows us to adjust for and con-
duct measurement of important peer effects in econometric settings. The proposed
method adequately controls for potential biases and addresses many of the complica-
tions in network estimation. Wider acceptance and use of peer effect models within
econometrics will allow us to more widely contemplate and exploit the potential
role of networks in enacting and dispersing economic and social policy in numerous




1 Identification in the College Decision Equation
Identification as in Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) is achieved in the net-
work formation model through asymptotic theory, particularly in the case when few
networks are present. Homophily in observed characteristics, such that individuals
who are very dissimilar are unlikely to become friends, allows us to assume a level
of independence in the network. A summary of the theory can be found in Chan-
drasekhar (2016) and is expounded in Leung (2014). This theory derives a law of
large numbers and central limit theorem that can be applied to the network model.
The argument is repeated below in the context of this paper. The link formation
model can be expressed as
Dg,ij = 1[Ug,ij(Dg,Wg; θ, δ) > 0] · 1[Ug,ji(Dg,Wg; θ, δ) > 0] (1.1)
such that,
Wg = {cg,i, cg,j, cg,ij, Dg− ij, Fg− ij, ξg,i, ξg,j, εij; i, j ∈ Nn
}
,
where Nn is the set of all nodes. Leung defines the node statistic of node i,
ψi(Dg), such that ψi(Dg) is a function that depends only on the network Dg through
the set of links between all nodes connected to node i (the component of node i). We
would like to prove that a law of large numbers and central limit theorem exists for
corresponding network moments, which can be written as 1
Ng
∑Ng
i=1 ψi(Dg). In our
model we are interested in the network moments corresponding to the probability
of linkage i.e. P (Dg,ij = 1). Under certain conditions, {ψi(Dg); i ∈ Nn} forms an
α-mixing field, such that the linking decisions of individuals in the network are
sufficiently uncorrelated. This α-mixing field allows the establishment of a law of
large numbers and central limit theorem for network moments.
As laid out by Leung (2014) and Chandrasekhar (2016) the assumptions required
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for an α-mixing field to exist are as follows:
1. No coordination: Under θ, δ and for a given Wg, sets of nodes that aren’t
connected under any equilibrium make friendship linkage decisions indepen-
dently. i.e. isolated friendship networks have no incentive to coordinate on
their friendship decisions.
2. Homophily: Irrespective of endogenous network effects on utility, it is typically
not worthwhile to link directly to someone who is very far away in homophilic
characteristics.
Let d(i, j) be a matrix representing the difference in characteristics in which in-
dividuals display homophily. For example, in our model d(i, j) could contain the
difference in age or observed GPA for individuals i and j: d(i, j) =
[
|AGEg,i −
AGEg,j|, |GPAg,i − GPAg, j|
]
. As long as individuals are typically unlikely to link
with those far away in these characteristics, the homophily condition will hold. We
can express
Ug,ij(Dg, w; θ, δ) = Uij( d(i, j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
distance
, z(D,w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous
, f(w)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exogenous
; θ, δ) (1.2)
so that z represents non-homophilic endogenous network effects (which may depend
on the network D) and f represents non-homophilic exogenous network effects. As
such the homophily assumption says:
lim
d(i,j)→∞
Uij(d(i, j), z̄, f(w); θ̄, δ̄) < 0 (1.3)
for f(w) ≤ f̄ , and the probability of f(w) > f̄ is sufficiently low, such that the
exogenous and endogenous effects are generally bounded.
3. Thin Tails: The distribution of εij has thin tails such that P (εij > r) ≤ Ce−κr
for some C,κ > 0. This condition is satisfied if εij is normally distributed as in
our model.
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4. Increasing Domain: supn maxi∈Nn(#j ∈ Nn : |d(i, j) < r0|) < ∞, for some
r0 > 0. This says that the largest number of individuals that are at most a
distance r0 away from any other individual is finite. Communities are small
relative to the overall network.
5. Diversity: For any individual i and distance r, there exists a set of nodes S
containing i such that any k ∈ S satisfies d(i, k) < r and d(k, l) ≥ 9κ−1 log r
for l /∈ S and κ−1 given in condition 3.
This condition ensures that there is sufficient diversity in the distance characteristics.
Diversity ensures that α(i, j) decays at a sufficiently fast rate for a CLT. This is a
sufficient condition to prove that P (Di,j = 1) → 0 as d(i, j) → ∞. In our case, we
use several homophilic indicators; parents education, personality variables, School
achievement, age, race and gender to ensure sufficient diversity.
2 Additional tables and figures
2.1 Chapter 1
Table 2.1: Test of Equality of LATEs over different intervals
Ranges of US for LATEj (0,0.04) (0.08,0.12) (0.16,0.20) (0.24,0.28) (0.32,0.36) (0.40,0.44)
Ranges of US for LATEj+1 (0.08,0.12) (0.16,0.20) (0.24,0.28) (0.32,0.36) (0.40,0.44) (0.48,0.52)
Difference in LATEs 0.0502 0.0723 0.0937 0.1145 0.1346 0.1542
p-value 0.5333 0.3000 0.2333 0.1333 0.0667 0.0667
Ranges of US for LATEj (0.48,0.52) (0.56,0.60) (0.64,0.68) (0.72,0.76) (0.80,0.84) (0.88,0.92)
Ranges of US for LATEj+1 (0.56,0.60) (0.64,0.68) (0.72,0.76) (0.80,0.84) (0.88,0.92) (0.96,1)
Difference in LATEs 0.1731 0.1915 0.2093 0.2264 0.2430 0.2589
p-value 0.1333 0.1333 0.1667 0.1667 0.1333 0.1333
joint p-value 0.13333
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No Networks No ξg Full Model
Figure 2.1: MTE with corr(Xg, U) = 0.3
No Networks No ξg Full Model
Figure 2.2: MTE with corr(Xg, U) = 0.75
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(a) θ1 (b) θ3,1 (c) θ3,2 (d) θ3,3
(e) θ4 (f) θ5 (g) δ
(h) ξ43 (i) ξ101 (j) ξ151
Figure 2.3: Network Formation MCMC plots
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(a) γ1 (b) γ0 (c) γ2,1 (d) γ2,2
(e) γ2,3 (f) γ3,1 (g) γ3,2 (h) γ3,3
(i) α1 (j) α2
Figure 2.4: Treatment Equation MCMC plots
70
2.2 Chapter 2
Table 2.2: Test of Equality of LATEs over different intervals for high school networks
Ranges of US for LATEj (0,0.04) (0.08,0.12) (0.16,0.20) (0.24,0.28) (0.32,0.36) (0.40,0.44)
Ranges of US for LATEj+1 (0.08,0.12) (0.16,0.20) (0.24,0.28) (0.32,0.36) (0.40,0.44) (0.48,0.52)
Difference in LATEs 0.2325 0.2497 0.2698 0.2929 0.3194 0.3496
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ranges of US for LATEj (0.48,0.52) (0.56,0.60) (0.64,0.68) (0.72,0.76) (0.80,0.84) (0.88,0.92)
Ranges of US for LATEj+1 (0.56,0.60) (0.64,0.68) (0.72,0.76) (0.80,0.84) (0.88,0.92) (0.96,1)
Difference in LATEs 0.3838 0.4222 0.4650 0.5124 0.5646 0.6216
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0
joint p-value 0
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(a) Shy (b) Independent (c) Ageg,i −Ageg,j (d) GPAg,i −GPAg,j
(e) Father College (f) Female (g) Gg− (h) Fg−
(i) δ (j) ξ43 (k) ξ101 (l) ξ151
Figure 2.5: Network formation MCMC plots for high school networks
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(a) Endogenous (b) Female (c) Parents: College
(d) Exogenous: Fe-
male




(i) α3 (j) α5
Figure 2.6: Treatment Equation MCMC plots for high school networks
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